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I. INTRODUCTION
Physicians who conduct clinical research with human subjects
face a profound conflict in professional roles. As physicians, they are
committed to promoting the best interests of current patients. As
researchers, however, their goal is to produce generalizable knowledge
by studying the effects of interventions in broad cohorts of subjects.'
Because producing generalizable knowledge often requires actions
that are inconsistent with the best interests of the individuals enrolled
in a study, these dual objectives often come into conflict. In such
situations, where should the physician-researcher's loyalties lie?
While this question has long been of interest to physicians and
bioethicists, it has largely escaped the attention of lawyers. A recent
wave of lawsuits against clinical researchers, 2 however, is likely to
change this situation. In evaluating these claims, courts will have to
determine whether researchers owe subjects the same duty of care
that physicians owe to their patients, or whether the researcher-
subject relationship involves a different set of legal obligations-and,
if it does, how those obligations should be defined.
3
1. Some commentators have begun using the term "participant" to describe individuals
enrolled in medical research, rather than the word "subject," in order to "reinforce the aspiration
to involve participants more directly in research and its oversight." COMM. ON ASSESSING THE
SYS. FOR PROT. HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS, INST. OF MED., PRESERVING PUBLIC TRUST:
ACCREDITATION AND HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANT PROTECTION PROGRAMS 34 (2001); see also
Benedict Carey, The Subject ... Is Subjects, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at Fl (discussing guide-
lines by the American Psychological Association that reject the term "subject" as "too impersonal,
stripping people of their individuality, their humanity" and that urge the use of the word "par-
ticipant," which "implies consent"). For two reasons, this Article does not adopt that terminol-
ogy. First, it is inconsistent with the language used in the federal regulations governing human
"subject" protections. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(g) (2004) ("Human subject means an individual who is
or becomes a participant in research"); 45 C.F.R. § 46.102() (2004) ("Human subject means a liv-
ing individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student)" conducts research).
Second, it ignores the fact that individuals who enroll in research enter into a situation fraught
with disparities of knowledge and power. Rather than empowering these people, describing
them as "participants" may increase their vulnerability by creating the false impression that
their relationship with researchers is no different from ordinary arm's-length transactions.
2. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
3. This Article assumes that lawsuits against researchers would not be governed by strict
liability, as research is unlikely to fit within the definition of an "abnormally dangerous" activity.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) (listing factors used to determine when an
activity is "abnormally dangerous"). Whether a no-fault administrative compensation system
should be established for injured research subjects is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. COMM.
ON ASSESSING THE SYS. FOR PROT. HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS, INST. OF MED., NAT'L
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At one extreme, courts might conclude that researchers have
the same therapeutic obligations to subjects in clinical trials that phy-
sicians owe patients receiving ordinary medical treatment, a position
advanced by several commentators in the medical and bioethics
literature. 4  According to this approach, researchers providing
potentially therapeutic interventions 5 in the context of clinical trials
may not deviate from the best interests of individual subjects, because
to do so would violate the physician's professional obligation to pro-
mote the patient-subject's wellbeing.
6
As explained below, however, the methodological demands of
clinical trials often pose unavoidable conflicts with the medical
interests of individual subjects.7 Thus, if taken seriously, the view
that researchers' duties are equivalent to those of treating physicians
would require a virtual prohibition of clinical research. Moreover, the
approach ignores the fact that some individuals might rationally
choose to sacrifice the therapeutic commitment of a physician-patient
relationship in exchange for other possible benefits of a clinical trial.
Alternatively, courts could take the opposite position-i.e., that
because clinical trials do not constitute a form of medical treatment,
researchers have no obligation to promote subjects' individual medical
ACADS., RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
188-94 (Daniel D. Federman et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH] (proposing
such a system). Even if such a system were created, it is unlikely that it would eliminate sub-
jects' right to sue for damages if legal fault could be established. See David M. Studdert &
Troyen A. Brennan, Toward A Workable Model of "No-Fault" Compensation for Medical Injury in
the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 230 (2001) (suggesting that it would be 'legally and
politically unrealistic to anticipate that any state would undertake wholesale replacement of tort
law with a no-fault scheme").
4. See discussion infra Part III.A.
5. Selecting a term to describe the drugs and other medical interventions offered to sub-
jects in clinical trials is not easy. On the one hand, because these interventions have the poten-
tial to improve the subjects' medical conditions, it is tempting to refer to them as "medical treat-
ments." Certainly, many research subjects view them that way, given that individuals often
enroll in clinical trials as a means of receiving "cutting-edge" therapies. See infra note 101 and
accompanying text. Moreover, in some cases, subjects actually receive the same drugs or proce-
dures given to patients outside of research - for example, in studies designed to determine the
relative efficacy of two or more standard treatments, or when subjects in a control group receive
standard treatment as a basis for comparing the results of an investigational intervention. On
the other hand, describing research interventions as medical treatments is potentially mislead-
ing, because it obscures the differences between being a research subject and receiving a physi-
cian's individualized attention in the context of an ordinary physician-patient relationship. See
discussion infra Part II. Whenever possible, therefore, this Article avoids the term "medical
treatments" in describing the interventions offered to subjects in clinical trials. Instead, aspects
of research that may provide direct medical benefits to subjects are described as "potentially
therapeutic interventions," while aspects that do not offer potential direct benefits to subjects are
described as "nontherapeutic" interventions.
6. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
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interests.8  Such an approach would emphasize the researcher's
commitment to producing scientifically valid data, a consideration not
relevant when physicians provide care outside of research. Because
producing scientifically valid data often requires actions inconsistent
with subjects' medical interests, courts might conclude that it is
illogical to hold researchers to the same therapeutic obligations as
treating physicians. Commentators who endorse this approach argue
that protecting subjects' individual interests is the function of the
informed consent process and that subjects who have consented to
participate in a study should not rely on the researcher to look out for
their individual needs.9
While this position avoids the restrictiveness of the first
approach, the view that researchers have no obligation to protect
subjects' medical interests errs too far in the opposite direction. Its
reliance on informed consent as the primary mechanism for protecting
subjects' welfare ignores the fact that the process of informed consent
suffers from significant limitations. In addition, even when the
validity of subjects' consent cannot reasonably be doubted, the process
of human experimentation implicates interests beyond those of the
individuals who agree to be subjects. Regulatory oversight of research
addresses some of these issues, but these oversight mechanisms are
not designed to identify specific individuals for whom enrolling or
continuing in a study poses unacceptable risks.
Accordingly, this Article develops an alternative vision of the
researcher-subject relationship, one that neither holds researchers to
the same therapeutic obligations as treating physicians nor absolves
researchers from any obligation to attend to subjects' individual
medical needs. As a basis for such an approach, this Article examines
legal principles applicable to individuals in relationships governed by
fiduciary principles, including trustees, corporate directors, and
partners. Fiduciary principles provide a useful framework for
thinking about the relationship between researchers and subjects
because they recognize that relationships characterized by trust and
dependency create an unusually high danger of exploitation and
abuse. To minimize these risks, the fiduciary is charged with an
obligation to protect the best interests of the beneficiary of the
relationship and is presumptively prohibited from pursuing her own
interests or those of someone else. Yet, fiduciary principles also
accommodate the possibility that deviations from the exclusive pursuit
of the beneficiary's best interests can sometimes be appropriate; thus,
See discussion infra Part III.B.
See infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
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the fiduciary's obligation to refrain from pursuing conflicting interests
can, under some circumstances, be limited or waived. Notably,
however, the beneficiary's consent is generally insufficient to justify a
fiduciary's pursuit of interests potentially adverse to those of the
beneficiary. Instead, in most contexts, the law imposes additional
requirements to ensure that the fiduciary's actions are objectively fair.
Admittedly, there are important differences between the
researcher-subject relationship and the types of relationships
traditionally governed by fiduciary principles. However, the point of
examining fiduciary principles is not to show that the researcher-
subject relationship necessarily is a fiduciary relationship, but instead
to suggest how a duty to protect a vulnerable party's interests can
co-exist with actions that simultaneously may threaten that party's
overall needs. After explaining why it makes sense to apply a
fiduciary law framework to clinical research, this Article explains how
fiduciary principles can accommodate the tension between the pursuit
of scientific knowledge and subjects' individual needs.
This Article does not explore the financial conflicts of interest
that increasingly pervade the world of biomedical research, such as
the conflicts that arise when researchers have financial stakes in the
companies sponsoring a study. 10 Unlike the issues discussed in this
Article, those conflicts are not inherent in the nature of clinical
research. Instead, they stem from the particular way that research is
financed, and, at least theoretically, could be eliminated by developing
alternative financing mechanisms. By contrast, the conflicts explored
in this Article are inherent in the nature of clinical trials, as they stem
from unavoidable tensions between the pursuit of generalizable
knowledge and the best interests of individual subjects.1'
10. See generally Mark Barnes & Patrik S. Florencio, Investigator. IRB and Institutional
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research: Past, Present, and Future, 32 SETON
HALL L. REV. 525 (2002) (advocating increased counterincentives to fight increasing financial
influences in research); Mark Barnes & Patrik S. Florencio, Financial Conflicts of Interest in
Human Subjects Research: The Problem of Institutional Conflicts, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390
(2002) (providing a framework to conceptualize and manage institutional conflicts of interest);
Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry,
342 N. ENG. J. MED. 1539 (2000) (discussing the impact of financial incentives on drug studies);
Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB Oversight as the
Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 379 (2000) (advocating
regulatory changes to encourage IRBs to better address conflicts of interest).
11. But cf. Deborah Hellman, Evidence, Belief, and Action: The Failure of Equipoise to Re-
solve the Ethical Tension in the Randomized Clinical Trial, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 375, 379
(2002) (arguing that "the randomized clinical trial is not the only way to gather information
about which therapies are effective," and that "[o]ther methods that also offer useful information
may pose less ethical strain").
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Part II of this Article provides general background on clinical
research with human subjects, including a brief discussion of the
existing oversight mechanisms for research and the growing wave of
litigation against researchers seeking compensation for research-
related harms. Part III explores the conflicts inherent in clinical
research, including the methodological features of clinical trials that
can compromise individual subjects' medical needs. Part IV then
considers two possible approaches to the relationship between
researchers and subjects in clinical trials - at one extreme, the view
that researchers have the same obligations as treating physicians, and
at the other, the view that researchers have no obligation to promote
subjects' medical welfare. After explaining the problems with each of
these positions, Part V turns to the law governing fiduciary relation-
ships as a model to conceptualize the legal relationship between
researchers and subjects. It begins by examining the legal principles
applicable to traditional fiduciaries, including trustees, corporate
directors, and partners. Then, it goes on to examine the implications
of these principles for the relationship between researchers and
subjects in clinical trials. Finally, Part VI applies a framework
grounded in fiduciary law principles to a hypothetical case involving a
subject injured in a clinical trial, explaining how the framework would
regulate the extent to which researchers could deviate from subjects'
medical needs.
II. BACKGROUND
Although activities that could be characterized as human
experimentation have existed at least since the time of Hippocrates,
research as we know it did not emerge until the early nineteenth
century, when physicians "began to evaluate the effectiveness of
therapeutic techniques statistically."12 This effort to apply statistical
methods to the evaluation of medical interventions is the essence of
the research enterprise. Thus, when a physician tries out a
completely new way of treating a patient based on a hunch that
deviating from standard treatment will produce a better result, in
some sense one might say that she is conducting an "experiment" on
the patient, but she is not engaged in "research" as that term is
commonly used. Instead, the term "research" describes activities
"designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and
12. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 54-55 (1982).
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thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge. ' 13 The
development of generalizable knowledge is thus both the underlying
goal of research and the basis for distinguishing research from
ordinary medical care. 14
Human subjects are used in many different types of research,
ranging from surveys and focus groups, to reviews of identifiable
medical records or human tissue samples, to clinical trials evaluating
new therapies or drugs. 15 A clinical trial is defined as a "controlled
study involving human subjects, designed to evaluate prospectively
the safety and effectiveness of new drugs or devices or of behavioral
interventions."'16 The "gold standard" for clinical research is the
randomized controlled trial, in which one group of subjects is
randomly assigned to receive an investigational intervention while one
or more other groups receive either a different intervention or a
placebo. To the extent feasible, randomized controlled trials are
"double-masked," meaning that neither the investigators nor the
subjects know who is receiving the experimental intervention and who
is in the control group until the study has concluded. 17
Each of these methodological features of clinical trials is
designed to promote the statistical validity of the resulting data.
Dividing the subjects into different groups, each of which is treated
identically-except that one group receives the experimental
intervention and the others do not-reduces the likelihood that
confounding variables will affect the validity of the results. Assigning
subjects to each group randomly is seen as "an essential element of
experimental research because it makes more likely the probability
that differences observed between subject groups are the result of the
experimental intervention," as opposed to differences in the character-
13. NAT'L COMM. FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMED. AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1978)
[hereinafter BELMONT REPORT]; see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2004) (defining "research" as "a
systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to
develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge").
14. See generally Nancy M.P. King, The Line Between Clinical Innovation and Human Ex-
perimentation, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 573 (2002) (discussing the often-nebulous distinction be-
tween research and treatment ).
15. See generally RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 32-36 (describing the broad
range of activities that constitute research with human subjects).
16. OFFICE FOR PROT. FROM RESEARCH RISKS, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK: HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTIONS ch. 4 [hereinafter




istics of the various groups.18 Finally, the use of double-masking seeks
to prevent the expectations of researchers or subjects from influencing
their interpretation of the events that occur during the study, while
also attempting to reduce the potential impact of the placebo effect. 19
Most clinical trials, as well as other forms of human subject
research, are subject to extensive regulatory oversight by federal
agencies. The primary federal regulations governing human subject
research are known as the "Common Rule," which derives its name
from the fact that it has been adopted in identical form by over a
dozen agencies that conduct or support research with human
subjects. 20 In addition to the Common Rule, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has promulgated its own regulations governing
human subject research that are similar to the Common Rule in most
respects. 21 The Common Rule and the FDA regulations apply to most
human subject research in this country, although some research
remains exempt from regulatory scrutiny.
22
Both the Common Rule and the FDA regulations require
proposals for human subject research to be reviewed and approved by
institutional review boards ("IRBs"), committees comprised of both
researchers and lay members, most of whom serve as volunteers.
23
The IRB's most important functions are to weigh the risks and
benefits of research protocols and to ensure that the researchers have
developed adequate plans for obtaining the subjects' informed
18. Id.
19. The placebo effect refers to improvements or side effects that "reflect imagination or an-
ticipation rather than actual power of a drug." Id.
20. See 1 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ETHICAL AND
POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 156 (2001) [hereinafter NAT'L
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N] (noting that the Common Rule covers eighteen federal agencies).
Because most human subject research is conducted or supported by the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS), citations to the Common Rule typically refer to the DHHS version
of the regulations, which are codified at 45 C.F.R. part 46 (2004).
21. 21 C.F.R. pt. 56 (2004).
22. The regulations apply to all research conducted or supported by the federal government,
as well as to all research related to the development of drugs or medical devices, regardless of
whether federal funding is involved. In addition, most institutions that conduct federally-funded
research have signed "assurances" with the federal government, in which they agree to comply
with the federal regulations in all of their research with human subjects. See Jesse A. Goldner,
An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the Regulatory Implications of
Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 63, 99-100 (1993) (discussing these federal
"assurances"). However, "[a]n unknown amount of nonfederally funded research is completely
unregulated under the federal system." NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 20, at
46 (observing that unregulated research "may include experimental surgical techniques, re-
search on reproductive technologies, some uses of approved drugs and medical devices, and re-
search use of private, identifiable data").
23. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107-109 (2004) (specifying requirements for IRBs' membership and
functioning).
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consent.24 The regulations contain specific requirements for obtaining
informed consent to human subject research, related both to the
substantive information that must be disclosed to subjects and the
manner in which the subject's consent must be documented. 25
In addition to IRBs, some studies, particularly those involving
multiple sites, employ data safety monitoring boards ("DSMBs") to
provide ongoing monitoring of clinical trials as the study proceeds.
26
In addition to reviewing reports of adverse events that occur during a
trial, DSMBs can monitor the data emerging from the study to
determine whether there are sufficiently significant differences
between the results in the experimental and control groups to warrant
stopping the trial.27 However, the federal regulations do not require
the use of DSMBs in most situations, leaving the decision whether to
convene one up to the trial's sponsor. 28
Until recently, the role of litigation has been quite limited in
the area of human subject research, but in recent years this has begun
to change. 29  A new wave of litigation against researchers and
research institutions has emerged, based on a variety of legal theories,
including informed consent violations, claims related to the
inappropriate enrollment of subjects or the improper monitoring of
subjects' health during the course of a study, and theories related to
researchers' alleged fraudulent conduct or conflicts of interest.30 As
one recent survey of this litigation observes, "Because the recent spate
of clinical trials cases is still working its way through the courts, there
are few published opinions that allow us to gauge the evolution of the
24. The IRB's obligations are set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2004).
25. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116-117 (2004).
26. See Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, the Institutional
Review Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725, 762-66 (2001) (discussing the role
of DSMBs).
27. See id. at 763 (discussing various reasons that a DSMB may suggest trial modifications
or termination). For example, a placebo-controlled trial of drug designed to treat heart failure in
African-Americans was recently halted after a DSMB concluded that "it would be unethical to
continue giving some patients a placebo because those getting the drug were living significantly
longer." Andrew Pollack, Drug Approved for Heart Failure in Black Patients, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2004, at C1.
28. See Hoffman, supra note 26, at 764 (noting that DSMBs are not required unless the re-
search is conducted in an emergency setting).
29. See Alice Dembner, Lawsuits Target Medical Research Patient Safeguards, Oversight
Key Issues, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2002, at Al (noting that "[flor years medical researchers
were largely immune from lawsuits" but that a new upsurge in suits "is sending shivers through
the research community").
30. See Michelle M. Mello et al., The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 40, 41 (2003) (discussing the trend of bringing "routine informed con-
sent claim [s]" under a variety of other legal theories).
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common law in this area."31 One of the primary unresolved issues
relates to the standard of care that courts will apply in this context
and the relationship of that standard to both the federal regulations
governing human subject research and to "garden-variety medical
malpractice cases."3 2 In order to understand the complexity of that
issue, it is first necessary to examine the differences between research
and ordinary medical treatment.
III. THE UNDERLYING CONFLICT IN CLINICAL RESEARCH
At the heart of clinical research lies a fundamental conflict. On
the one hand, clinical research involves the provision of medications or
other interventions to individuals in need of medical attention-
activities that look a great deal like traditional medical treatment.
33
In fact, individuals often participate in clinical trials out of a desire to
obtain state-of-the-art medical therapy,3 4 and to do so they often must
forego other treatments available outside the study. On the other
hand, despite the close resemblance of clinical research to ordinary
treatment, the goals of the physician-researcher are strikingly
different from those of physicians who treat patients in a nonresearch
setting. Unlike treating physicians, who are expected to be guided
solely by the best interests of individual patients, 35 physicians in
clinical trials are not seeking to achieve the best medical outcome for
each subject in the study. Instead, the underlying goal of research is
the production of generalizable knowledge, 36 i.e., data that can be used
to improve the medical care available for patients in the future. To
achieve this goal, researchers must be concerned primarily with the
implications of their actions for the validity of the data, not the
consequences for any particular subject's medical needs.
While producing generalizable knowledge does not always
conflict with the best interests of individual subjects, certain conflicts
31. Id. at 43.
32. Id.
33. Because this Article focuses on clinical research with individuals in need of medical at-
tention, it does not directly address the duties researchers owe to "normal healthy volunteers."
See generally IRB WORKGROUP, NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, SAFEGUARDING HEALTHY
RESEARCH SUBJECTS: PROTECTING VOLUNTEERS FROM HARM, available at http://www.
health.state.ny.usnysdohlprovider/volunteer/intro.htm (discussing the use of healthy subjects in
biomedical research) (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
34. See infra notes 101 and accompanying text.
35. See Donna T. Chen et al., Clinical Research and the Physician-Patient Relationship, 138
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 669, 669 (2003) ("Clinical practice is oriented toward providing pa-
tients with individualized care by physicians who are dedicated primarily to their patients' best
interests.").
36. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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between the subjects' best interests and the goals of a study are
unavoidable. Many such conflicts result from the demands of sound
research methodology, particularly the randomized, double-masked,
controlled clinical trial, which, as discussed above, is generally
considered the "gold standard" for testing new drugs or medical
procedures.37 Such trials depend on a variety of techniques that can
undermine the medical best interests of individual subjects.
The first such technique is the process of randomization. In
clinical practice, physicians faced with a choice between two or more
treatments decide which is most appropriate based on a variety of
factors, including evidence from the medical literature (if any exists),
personal experience and tha. of their colleagues, and patient
preferences about the different risks and benefits associated with each
option. 38 In a clinical trial, by contrast, subjects are assigned to
different interventions randomly. Randomized assignments are not
necessarily harmful to patients; in fact, in the absence of clear
evidence about which intervention is preferable, the flip of a coin may
be as good a way as any to determine which one a particular patient
should receive.3 9 However, even if it is impossible to determine which
of two interventions is objectively preferable for patients in general,
there may be good grounds for particular individuals to prefer one
over the other. Outside of research, physicians are expected to
uncover such reasons by carefully investigating the patient's unique
circumstances. 40 The randomized trial deliberately avoids this degree
of individualized assessment, potentially providing subjects with
interventions that are inferior in light of the subject's particular
needs. 41
37. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
38. See Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Rehabilitating Equipoise, 13 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 93, 109 (2003) (discussing factors physicians consider in making treatment recommen-
dations).
39. See Howard Mann & Benjamin Djulbegovic, Letter to the Editor, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 5 (arguing that when there is genuine uncertainty about the relative
merits of two treatments, "randomization offers the participant the best chance (fifty-fifty odds)
of getting the best intervention, if one is subsequently shown to be superior"); cf. Steven M.
Grunberg & William T. Cefaul, The Integral Role of Clinical Research in Clinical Care, 348 N.
ENG. J. MED. 1386, 1387 (2003) (suggesting that physicians who maintain that randomization
violates their Hippocratic obligation to promote patients' best interests have failed "to recognize
the limitations of their own knowledge").
40. Of course, the statement in the text describes the ideal situation; in reality, the nature
and extent of physician-patient communication often falls short of this ideal. See, e.g., Peter H.
Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 903-05 (1994) (describing the wide gap
between informed consent "idealists" and "realists").
41. In an influential essay published in 1974, Charles Fried argued that, even in the ab-
sence of firm evidence favoring one treatment over another, the failure to tailor each subject's
397
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Consider, for example, the debate over whether to provide
radiation to women who have stage two breast cancer with three or
fewer malignant lymph nodes. 42  Some evidence suggests that
providing radiation to these women could reduce the risk that they
will have a recurrence of cancer, but it is unclear whether the reduced
cancer risk would translate into a greater chance of long-term
survival. At the same time, radiation involves nontrivial discomforts,
risks, and costs, making the decision to use it in these circumstances a
difficult choice. Yet, even in the absence of clear evidence about the
utility of radiation, some women might have strong feelings about
whether undergoing radiation is appropriate for them. Women who
are particularly concerned about avoiding a recurrence of cancer
might want to receive radiation regardless of its potential impact on
the length of their lives. Other women might prefer to forego the
unproven benefits of radiation in exchange for a better quality of life
in the present. A clinical trial that randomly assigned women to "ra-
diation" or "no radiation" arms would make it impossible to take into
account these individualized assessments of radiation's benefits and
risks. 43
Second, once a subject has been assigned to a particular arm of
a study, the specifics of the regimen-for example, the dosages of
drugs, the timing of interventions, and the duration of treatments-
are dictated by the terms of the protocol, with little or no room for
variation based on the individual subject's circumstances. 44 Outside of
research, by contrast, physicians are free to structure all aspects of
treatment based on the individual patient's situation, making
necessary adjustments as more information is learned about the
patient's reaction to the chosen interventions. For example, if a
treatment to his or her particular circumstances amounts to a "sacrifice" of the individual for the
good of the experiment:
One might say that the individual patient has perhaps not been sacrificed in the crude
sense that the best available treatment has been withheld from him, but he has been
sacrificed in that for the sake of the experimental design his interest in having his
particular circumstances investigated has been sacrificed. But this amounts to the
same thing.
Charles Fried, Medical Experimentation: Personal Integrity and Social Policy, in 5 CLINICAL
STUDIES 53 (A.G. Bearn et al. eds., 1974).
42. See Laurie Tarkan, A Debate on Radiation in Breast Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004,
at Fl (discussing the debate over radiation's impact on survival rates ).
43. Such studies were, in fact, attempted, but they ended due to the inability to attract a
sufficient number of subjects. See id. (quoting a doctor saying that there have been "several ran-
domized studies").
44. See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 282 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining how the rigidities of scientific protocols severely restrict
the capacity for individual decisionmaking).
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patient taking antidepressants experiences difficulty sleeping, the
physician may recommend lowering the dosage; if the drug does not
appear to be working, a different drug may be tried. In a clinical trial,
these options are rarely available. 45 In most cases, the only way a
subject can receive treatment in a manner that deviates from the
protocol is to withdraw from the study.46 This option is undesirable
for the researcher, who has an interest in maintaining sufficient
enrollment to generate usable data, and also may be undesirable for
subjects, particularly those who have difficulty obtaining access to
alternative sources of care.
47
Third, in many clinical trials, a variety of interventions are
performed solely for the purpose of gathering data, without any direct
benefit to the subject's own care. 48 While many of these interventions
are only minimally burdensome, such as additional blood draws or
physical examinations, others can pose more substantial risks. For
example, in some studies subjects are given lumbar punctures (spinal
taps) to withdraw cerebrospinal fluid for analysis, 49 a procedure that,
while usually safe, can lead to persistent headache and "serious
neurological sequelae."
50
Placebos are a specific type of nontherapeutic intervention used
in clinical trials that are especially difficult to reconcile with the
physician's traditional commitment to promoting an individual's
medical best interests. Placebos are usually inert interventions given
to subjects in a control group "to determine whether improvement and
45. Some commentators argue that the rigidity of research protocols is not substantially
different from the use of practice guidelines outside of research. See, e.g., Grunberg and Cefalu,
supra note 39, at 1387 (arguing that "the logical extension" of concerns about the rigidity of pro-
tocols "would be that one should object to the growing body of evidence-based treatment guide-
lines and follow-up outcome measures that are becoming part of standard medical care"). How-
ever, practice guidelines are simply advisory documents; physicians are not required to follow
them in the same manner that researchers are required to adhere to a protocol. It is true that
practice guidelines are sometimes used as evidence of the standard of care in medical malprac-
tice cases, but deviation from the guidelines has never been found to constitute negligence per se.
Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 672 n.124 (2001).
46. See E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines:
Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 16 ("Commonly a drug dosage can-
not be raised or lowered even when such a change might suit the patient better, unless explicitly
permitted by the protocol.").
47. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
48. See Chen et al., supra note 35, at 669 (noting that "participation in some trials may in-
clude medication washout periods, biopsies, overnight hospital stays, imaging studies, blood
draws, and questionnaires").
49. See, e.g., Stephan Haimowitz et al., Uninformed Decisionmaking: The Case of Surrogate
Research Consent, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 9, 11-13 (defending the nonthera-
peutic use of lumbar punctures in research involving suicidal teenagers).
50. Editorial, Lumbar Puncture and Headache, 316 BRIT. MED. J. 1018, 1018 (1998).
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side effects may reflect imagination or anticipation rather than actual
power of a drug."5 1 While some subjects may actually do better after
receiving placebos, 52 the purpose of placebos in research is not to be
nefit the subject. Moreover, even though placebos are generally
harmless substances, 53 subjects who receive them bear the risks of
foregoing active interventions for the condition being investigated.
These risks, which can be considerable, are imposed because of the
placebo's potential usefulness to the quality of the data, not because of
any expected benefits to the individuals involved.
Finally, double-masked trial designs, in which neither the
investigator nor the subject knows which intervention the subject is
receiving, can compromise the best medical care of the subjects in the
study. This is particularly true when subjects experience adverse
reactions during the course of clinical research. Uncertainty about the
cause of the subject's reaction may make it difficult to determine how
best to respond. 54
Ultimately, the most significant source of the conflict between
the pursuit of generalizable knowledge and the medical best interests
of individual subjects has less to do with any of these specific
methodological features of clinical trials than with the differing goals
of researchers and treating physicians. Outside of research,
physicians' primary goal is to promote the individual patient's welfare.
While other factors also can come into play-for example, financial
incentives to limit treatment under managed care arrangements, 55 or
the need to use patients as teaching opportunities for residents in
academic medical centers 56-the treatment of individual patients is
51. IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 16.
52. See generally Kathleen M. Boozang, The Therapeutic Placebo: The Case for Patient De-
ception, 54 FLA. L. REV. 687 (2002) (discussing evidence suggesting that, in some circumstances,
placebos can produce better results than conventional treatments).
53. Placebos are not always harmless, however. See generally Ruth Macklin, The Ethical
Problems with Sham Surgery in Clinical Research, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 992 (1999) (criticizing
the use of sham brain surgery as a placebo control in a study evaluating the efficacy of fetal tis-
sue transplants for Parkinson's disease).
54. Another risk of research is that the investigational intervention will turn out not to
work, or that it will actually cause harm to the subjects. That risk, however, also exists when
physicians provide unproven therapies to patients in the ordinary clinical setting. It is therefore
not a risk inherent in the methodological design of clinical research, as are the risks discussed in
the text, but instead a risk associated with the use of unproven interventions in any context.
55. See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking
Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419, 465-73 (1997) (discussing conflicts of interest in managed care ar-
rangements).
56. See Atul Gawande, Education of a Knife, in COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTES ON AN
IMPERFECT SCIENCE 11, 24 (2002) (discussing the ethical conflicts inherent in the training of sur-
gical residents, and noting that, "[w]hen an attending physician brings a sick family member in
for surgery, people at the hospital think hard about how much to let trainees participate").
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still the raison d'tre of physicians' activities. In research, by contrast,
physicians judge themselves, and are judged by their peers, on the
quality of their data, not on whether they have provided the best
possible medical care to each person in a trial. Moreover, outside of
research, it is in everyone's interests for each patient to get better. To
prove a new treatment successful, however, the researcher must show
a statistically significant difference in outcomes between the different
arms of the study. Thus, if all of the subjects experience equally good
outcomes, those seeking to demonstrate the superiority of the new
intervention will consider the study to have been a failure.
The differing motivations of the researcher and the treating
physician are especially relevant at two junctures in a study. The first
is the initial decision by the researcher to enroll a particular
individual as a subject in a trial. While there are some situations in
which enrolling in a clinical trial can be in an individual's best
interests, 57 physicians committed exclusively to the welfare of
individual patients are likely to be cautious about research, given the
inherent risks of clinical trials outlined above. Even when a physician
believes that the experimental intervention offers particular promise
to a patient, it may be possible to gain access to the intervention
outside of the study,58 allowing the patient to receive the benefits of
the intervention without the loss of individualized care. Researchers
eager to enroll as many subjects as possible, however, have an
incentive to discount the risks of research enrollment, and to overlook
factors that might make it appropriate to recommend that an
individual receive treatment outside of the study.5 9
After the study begins, the differing motivations of the
researcher and clinician may also affect how physicians react when
subjects fail to respond to treatment or experience discomfort or other
adverse reactions to particular interventions. A physician concerned
solely with the best interests of the individual subject might
recommend that the subject drop out of the protocol, find out which of
the various interventions she has been receiving, and receive
individually-tailored treatment outside of the study. The researcher
concerned about maintaining enrollments, by contrast, has an
57. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
58. See Jerry Menikoff, The Hidden Alternative: Getting Investigational Treatments Off-
Study, 361 LANCET 63, 65 (2003) (noting that physicians have "a broad range of discretion in of-
fering a patient an unproven treatment when the doctor thinks that doing so may be in the pa-
tient's best interest," and that, as a result of this discretion, it is often possible to gain access to
experimental interventions outside of a study).
59. See id. at 64-65 (criticizing researchers for failing to inform subjects about the possibil-
ity of obtaining investigational interventions outside of a clinical trial).
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incentive to keep each subject in the study as long as possible, even if
doing so is inconsistent with a particular subject's wellbeing.
The potential impact of the researcher's decisions on the
welfare of subjects should not be underestimated. Despite extensive
oversight of clinical research by IRBs and DSMBs, 60 those entities
cannot identify every individual for whom enrolling or continuing in a
study poses unacceptable risks. While the IRB must approve the
study's general inclusion and exclusion criteria, the IRB's focus is on
the risks and benefits of a study for broad categories of potential
subjects, not on the desirability of enrolling in research for any
particular person. 61 Moreover, under the federal regulations, IRBs are
directed to weigh the risks of research against "the anticipated
benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that
may reasonably be expected to result."62 Thus, it is possible for a risky
study to be approved by an IRB even when no benefits are anticipated
for any of the subjects, based solely on the knowledge the study is
expected to produce.
As for problems that emerge in the course of the study, existing
oversight mechanisms provide only limited protection for individual
subjects. Although IRBs are required to conduct "continuing review"
of ongoing studies, 63 these reviews take place infrequently,64 and many
IRBs treat them as a low-priority task. 65 Moreover, most continuing
reviews focus on an analysis of statistical reports, not a detailed
examination of individual subjects' experiences. 66  Oversight by
DSMBs suffers from similar limitations. In addition, the use of
DSMBs is generally optional, and some commentators believe that
DSMBs are prone to conflicts of interest due to their financial ties to
research sponsors. 67 While both of these entities serve important
oversight functions, effective monitoring of the day-to-day experience
of individual subjects depends on the persons who are actually
60. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
61. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2004) (setting forth IRBs' obligations).
62. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (emphasis added).
63. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e).
64. See id. (providing that continuing reviews be conducted "at intervals appropriate to the
degree of risk, but not less than once per year").
65. See Hoffman, supra note 26, at 735 (explaining that "[flederal administrative agencies
cannot realistically monitor every activity of each IRB and cannot guarantee the welfare of all
trial participants").
66. See id. at 735 (noting criticisms that "continuing reviews are generally limited to the
reading of reports submitted by investigators, and IRBs do not conduct on-site inspection or re-
ceive feedback from research subjects").
67. Id. at 765-66.
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conducting the study - i.e., the principal investigator and other
members of the research team.
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF AN ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH TO THE
PROBLEM: WHY THE OBLIGATIONS OF RESEARCHERS MUST BE
DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF EITHER TREATING PHYSICIANS OR PURE
SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATORS
The conflict between the methodological demands of the
controlled clinical trial and the therapeutic interests of individual
subjects has not escaped the attention of physicians and bioethicists.
Many commentators have attempted to deal with the problem by
searching for a way to reconcile the conflict, so that physicians can
conduct research without sacrificing their commitment to promoting
the individual subjects' medical best interests.68 Underlying this
effort is the assumption that clinical researchers are first and
foremost physicians, subject to the same therapeutic obligations to
individual subjects that treating physicians owe to their patients.
At the other extreme, there have been occasional suggestions
that physicians conducting research should not be held to any of the
obligations of treating physicians because they are acting as
"scientists only."69 According to this approach, researchers' primary
obligation is to the integrity of their data, not to promoting the best
medical interests of the subjects in a trial. Thus, as long as the
subjects have provided informed consent to participate in the study,
the researcher has no obligation to ensure that the study promotes
individual subjects' medical needs.
Each of these positions takes an all-or-nothing view of
researchers' obligations: either researchers have the same duty to
provide individualized medical attention as treating physicians, or
they have no duty whatsoever to promote subjects' medical needs.
This Part argues that each of these extreme positions is untenable.
Equating the duties of researchers with those of treating physicians
ignores the fact that research is not treatment and that subjects have
consented to enter into a relationship in which advancing their
medical interests is not the primary goal. However, the view that
researchers have no duty to attend to the medical best interests of
individual subjects errs too far in the opposite direction. In addition to
being inconsistent with the expectations of most individuals who
68. See infra notes 70, 72-81, 89-93 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
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enroll in clinical trials, it undermines important societal interests in
overseeing the risks that subjects are asked to accept.
A. Equating the Duties of Researchers with Those of Treating
Physicians
Despite the significant differences between research and
ordinary treatment, some commentators maintain that "the ethics of
the physician-patient relationship must govern" clinical trials, and
that "physicians who conduct these trials have a 'therapeutic
obligation' to patients enrolled in them."70  This view obviously
presents a challenge to researchers, given the inherent conflicts in
clinical research outlined above.
71
The most influential attempt to answer this challenge was an
essay published by the physician Benjamin Freedman in 1987.72
Freedman's goal was to respond to the claim that physicians cannot
ethically randomize individuals between different arms of a study if
there is any reason to believe that one of the arms offers treatment
that is superior to the others. As Freedman notes, such a position
would make it difficult to conduct any randomized clinical trial, as
even "a slight accretion of evidence favoring one arm of the trial"
73
would make it unethical to subject individuals to the risk of
randomization. Taken to its extreme, it would preclude randomization
"as soon as the investigator perceives a difference between the
alternatives-whether or not any genuine difference exists."74 Such a
perception might be based on personal experience, preliminary data
that emerge during the course of a study, or even a "'gut feeling' or
'instinct' resulting from (or superimposed on) other considerations." 75
Freedman's response was not to challenge the critics'
underlying assumption-i.e., that it is unethical to randomize subjects
if the interventions used in one arm of the study are preferable to
those used in the other arms-but to reformulate the criteria for
determining when a genuine difference in the interventions actually
exists. According to Freedman, the relevant question is not whether a
70. Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, A Critique of Clinical Equipoise: Therapeutic Mis-
conception in the Ethics of Clinical Trials, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June, 2003, at 19, 20.
As discussed below, Miller and Brody do not themselves accept this position. See infra notes 156-
160 and accompanying text.
71. See discussion supra Part II.
72. Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 N. ENG. J. MED.
141 (1987).
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particular physician has some reason to believe that treatment A is
preferable to treatment B. Instead, what matters is whether there is
"an honest, professional disagreement among expert clinicians about
the preferred treatment," a state of affairs that Freedman referred to
as "clinical equipoise. '76 If there is no consensus in the professional
community about which treatment is preferable, a physician can
ethically ask individuals to submit to randomization-even if the
physician has a "decided preference" for one of the treatments and
would choose to receive that treatment herself if she were in the
subject's position. This standard of clinical equipoise is appropriate,
Freedman argued, because the quality of medical care is judged by
physicians' conformity to customary practice, not by their adherence to
their personal hunches or beliefs. 77
While Freedman's goal was to defend the randomized clinical
trial against ethical challenges, his insistence on clinical equipoise as
a prerequisite to randomization presents a barrier to some types of
studies that physicians might want to conduct. For example,
Freedman noted that his approach would preclude a study evaluating
the efficacy of a discredited treatment, such as laetrile: 78 "[W]hen
there is no support for a treatment regimen within the expert clinical
community, the first ethical requirement of a trial-clinical equipoise
-is lacking; it would therefore be unethical to conduct such a trial."
79
In addition, the principle of clinical equipoise would preclude
conducting a placebo-controlled trial when effective treatment for a
76. Id. at 144.
77. Id. The role of professional custom in determining the standard of medical care is dis-
cussed further infra note 267 and accompanying text.
78. Laetrile, a derivative of apricot pits, was a popular alternative treatment for cancer in
the 1970s. Andrew Vickers, Alternative Cancer Cures: "Unproven" or "'Disproven'?, 54 CA: A
CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 110, 114 (2004). The FDA, finding that laetrile was not generally rec-
ognized as safe and effective, refused to authorize the interstate distribution of the drug. The
Supreme Court upheld the FDA's determination. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544,
546, 551 (1979); see also C.G. Moertel et al., A Clinical Trial of Amygdalin (Laetrile) in the
Treatment of Human Cancer, 306 N. ENG. J. MED. 201, 201 (1982) (concluding that laetrile "is a
toxic drug that is not effective as a cancer treatment").
79. Freedman, supra note 72, at 145. Some commentators who accept the importance of
clinical equipoise have questioned whether the principle should apply when a treatment, al-
though discredited by mainstream physicians, is used by the public on the advice of alternative
practitioners. Under these circumstances, a study definitely disproving the efficacy of the treat-
ment could protect consumers from unnecessary risk. See Kathleen M. Boozang, National Policy
on CAM: The White House Commission Report, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 251, 258 (2003) (suggest-
ing that the problem is in part "a definitional quandary - does a disagreement between medical
doctors and [complementary and alternative medicine] practitioners establish clinical equi-
poise?").
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particular condition exists.80  In such circumstances, there is no
uncertainty in the professional community about the merits of
foregoing active treatment and receiving a placebo. Thus, if clinical
equipoise is an absolute requirement for ethically acceptable research,
placebo-controlled trials would be permitted only when no treatment
for a condition already exists, or in populations for whom the available
treatments have proven ineffective or intolerable.
81
To the extent Freedman's goal was to reconcile clinical research
with the patient-centered ethos of the medical profession, his principle
of clinical equipoise is only partially successful. At best, Freedman's
analysis demonstrates that randomized clinical trials do not always
conflict with the medical best interests of individual subjects. Yet,
even when all of the arms of a study are in a position of clinical
equipoise, the risks and benefits of each arm are not necessarily
equivalent for every individual subject. As discussed above, a
particular arm of the study may be preferable for certain individuals;
8 2
even if this is not known at the outset of the study, it may become
clear after a subject experiences negative reactions once the study has
begun. Randomization can compromise the best interests of these
particular subjects, regardless of whether clinical equipoise exists for
the study population as a whole.8 3  Moreover, even when
randomization itself is unproblematic, numerous other aspects of
clinical trials can undermine the welfare of subjects, including the
inflexibility of treatment protocols, the administration of risky
80. See Benjamin Freedman, Placebo-Controlled Trials and the Logic of Clinical Purpose,
12 IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 1.
81. Id. This standard raises the question of whether "existing treatments" include all
treatments theoretically available, or only those treatments actually available to the particular
patient population. Freedman accepted that, if "validated optimal treatment is not made freely
available to patients, because of cost constraints or otherwise," a placebo-controlled trial of a new
treatment could be ethically justified, but he cautioned that this principle "may only be applied
when background conditions of justice prevail within the health care system in question." Id. at
5; cf. David Orentlicher, Universality and Its Limits: When Research Ethics Can Reflect Local
Circumstances, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 403, 406 (2002) (arguing that, because "[t]he best avail-
able therapy varies from country to country," it was ethically justifiable to conduct a placebo-
controlled trial in Kenya testing the use of AZT to reduce the risk of HIV transmission from
pregnant women to their offspring, despite the fact that the use of AZT in those circumstances
was then the standard of care in the United States, because the researchers "were obligated to
provide the best therapy available in Kenya, not the best therapy available anywhere in the
world.").
82. See supra notes 43-47and accompanying text.
83. See Miller and Weijer, supra note 38, at 112 (arguing that clinical equipoise does not
answer the questions, "Is trial participation an appropriate alternative for this particular pa-
tient? Should this patient, in light of her condition and accruing medical evidence, continue to
participate in this study?").
406 [Vol. 58:2:387
2005] DUTIES TO SUBJECTS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH 407
nontherapeutic interventions, and the use of double-masked trial
designs.
8 4
The real problem with clinical equipoise, however, is not that it
fails to achieve the goals that motivated Freedman's analysis, but that
the goals themselves are misguided. In other words, the problem is
with the underlying assumption that researchers' duties are
equivalent to those of treating physicians, and that researchers
therefore owe subjects the same duty of therapeutic beneficence that
physicians owe patients when providing ordinary treatment. Not only
is this assumption unrealistic, given the inherent conflicts in clinical
research discussed above,8 5 but it also ignores the fact that individuals
who enroll in clinical trials consent to assume the role of a subject in
an experiment.8 6 It is true that the quality of the informed consent
process in many studies leaves much to be desired,8 7 and, as discussed
in the next Section, there are reasons to prohibit certain risks even
when the quality of the subjects' consent is not in dispute.
88
Nonetheless, in most circumstances, the law permits individuals to
decide for themselves the nature and extent of the risks to which they
are willing to be subjected. Thus, rather than starting with the
assumption that any deviation from the best interests of subjects is
inherently unacceptable, the more logical starting point is to presume
that such deviations are permissible as long as they are consensual.
Prohibitions on consensual deviations from subjects' best interests
should be regarded as exceptional situations, not as a general rule to
be applied to clinical trials in all cases.
84. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text. Oddly, some commentators who believe
in the importance of clinical equipoise are not opposed to the use of risky nontherapeutic inter-
ventions in clinical trials. For example, Charles Weijer argues that interventions that "are ad-
ministered with a therapeutic warrant," such as drugs and surgical procedures, must satisfy the
test of clinical equipoise because physicians' ethical obligations prevent them from providing
treatments known to be inferior to the standard of care. Charles Weijer, The Ethical Analysis of
Risk, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 344, 355-56 (2000). Yet, the only limit he would place on "non-
therapeutic procedures" - even those that are "invasive or otherwise fraught with risk" - is that
their risks must be balanced by the study's potential contribution to knowledge. Id. It is difficult
to understand why he considers it inherently unethical to provide potentially therapeutic inter-
ventions if they are in any way suboptimal, when he accepts the use of nontherapeutic proce-
dures that may actually involve much greater risks.
85. See discussion supra Part II.
86. The federal regulations permit research without the subject's informed consent only if
consent is provided by the subject's 'legally authorized representative," 45 C.F.R. § 46.116
(2004), or if the IRB waives the consent requirement. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c)-(d). The option of
waiving the consent requirement is available only in specific categories of minimal-risk research,
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d), and research related to certain types of emergency medical treatments, 21
C.F.R. § 50.24 (2004).
87. See infra notes 116-124 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 132-148 and accompanying text.
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Some commentators have suggested that relying on consent to
justify deviations from subjects' best interests would violate the
principle that individuals generally may not waive the right to sue for
medical negligence.8 9 For example, two bioethicists, observing that
"[c]onsent alone is an insufficient defense when a physician fails to act
according to the established standard," argue that "[p]rospective
research subjects should not be invited to consent to what by law
would constitute negligence in the practice of medicine."90  The
premise of their argument appears to be that the courts' unwillingness
to enforce agreements to assume the risks of medical negligence
means that physicians' cannot deviate from the patient's or subject's
best interests whether or not they have obtained informed consent. 91
To the extent these commentators are claiming that the duty to
act non-negligently should be no more waivable in research than it is
in ordinary treatment, their argument should not be controversial.
The nonwaiveability of the right to be free from medical negligence
stems from public policy judgments about the unequal bargaining
power between physicians and patients, combined with the societal
interest in ensuring competent medical care by establishing minimum
standards of treatment below which physicians may not fall.92 These
principles apply as strongly in medical research as they do in ordinary
treatment. Indeed, the federal regulations governing human subject
research explicitly prohibit asking subjects to waive their right to sue
for negligently-caused injuries. 93
89. See, e.g., Kathleen Cranley Glass & Duff Waring, Effective Trial Design Need Not Con-
flict with Good Patient Care, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 25, 26 (2002). The arguments for refusing to
enforce agreements not to sue for medical negligence are discussed at length in Tunkl v. Regents
of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963), which found that agreements to release
a hospital from liability for negligence are void as against public policy.
90. Glass & Waring, supra, note 89, at 26.
91. Samuel Hellman and Deborah Hellman have similarly argued against relying on con-
sent to justify deviations from subjects' medical interests:
[Olne might suggest that the patient has abrogated the rights implicit in a doctor-
patient relationship by signing an informed-consent form. We argue that such rights
cannot be waived or abrogated. They are inalienable. The right to be treated as an
individual deserving the physician's best judgment and care, rather than to be used as
a means to determine the best treatment for others, is inherent in every person. This
right, based on the concept of dignity, cannot be waived.
Samuel Hellman & Deborah S. Hellman, Of Mice But Not Men: Problems of the Randomized
Clinical Trial, 324 N. ENG. J. MED. 1585, 1587 (1991).
92. See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 446-47 (arguing that "[tihe public policy of this state has been, in
substance, to posit the risk of negligence upon the actor; in instances in which this policy has
been abandoned, it has generally been to allow or require that the risk shift to another party bet-
ter or equally able to bear it, not to shift the risk to the weak bargainer").
93. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2004) ("No informed consent, whether oral or written, may in-
clude any exculpatory language through which the subject or the representative ... appears to
release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability for negligence.").
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Yet, even if researchers have a nonwaivable obligation to avoid
negligent behavior, the concept of negligence does not mean the same
thing in clinical research that it does in ordinary treatment. Because
negligence means exposing people to risks that are not reasonable
under the circumstances, it is essential to take into account the
context of an activity when determining the acceptability of the risks
it involves. In an ordinary clinical interaction, the sole purpose of the
activity is to benefit the patient; thus, risks that are not necessary to
promote the patient's medical interests are negligent because they
undermine the very reason the activity is being conducted. In
research, by contrast, the primary goal of the activity is to develop
generalizable knowledge; even in studies that have the potential to
benefit the subjects directly, the pursuit of knowledge is ultimately
the reason the study is being done. Thus, in research it is not
necessarily negligent to deviate from subjects' medical interests,
provided that doing so can be justified by a sufficiently important
scientific goal.
This interpretation of negligence does not mean that the
subject's consent plays no role in justifying the risks associated with
research. On the contrary, if subjects (or their representatives) did
not provide informed consent to research, any deviations from their
best interests would be difficult to defend. 94 However, consent need
not be viewed as an agreement to waive the right to sue when a
researcher acts negligently, but instead as evidence that, in the
context of a clinical trial, certain deviations from the subjects' medical
interests do not constitute negligence at all.
That consent can legitimize risks that might otherwise be
considered unacceptably dangerous is the premise behind the doctrine
of "primary implied assumption of risk," a principle of tort law often
applied to activities like participatory sports and amusement park
rides.9 5 Unlike other forms of assumption of risk, which operate as
defenses to activities that have already been determined to be
negligent, primary implied assumption of risk is not a defense to
negligence but a tool for determining when negligence has occurred.
According to the doctrine, an individual who imposes risks on others
that might normally be considered unjustifiably dangerous will not be
94. The limited circumstances in which IRBs may waive the informed consent requirement,
see supra note 86, are consistent with this assumption, as they limit waivers to situations involv-
ing either minimal risk, 45 C.F.R. § 116(d), or life-threatening conditions that "necessitated in-
tervention," where available treatments are "unproven or unsatisfactory" and the risks of the
research interventions are "reasonable." 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(1), (a)(3)(iii).
95. See, e.g., Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 508 S.E.2d
565, 568-71 (S.C. 1998) (explaining the differences between various types of assumption of risk).
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found negligent if: (1) the risks were an inherent part of the activity in
which those exposed to the risks were voluntarily participating; and
(2) it was reasonable for the person imposing the risks to assume that
those participating in the activity knowingly accepted the dangers
involved. For example, it is not negligent to accidentally trip a player
in a game of tackle football, as the possibility of falling down is an
inherent part of the game, and each player can reasonably assume
that the others are aware of this danger and have agreed to accept it.
It would, however, be negligent to run down the sidewalk in a manner
likely to knock down pedestrians, both because causing pedestrians to
fall is not necessary to the activity of using the sidewalk and because
it is unreasonable to assume that a pedestrian has voluntary accepted
the risk of being knocked down.
A similar analysis can be applied to the risks of providing
medical interventions in a manner that potentially compromises the
best interests of the individuals receiving them. Just as it can be
reasonable to run into a participant in a football game but not a
pedestrian, providing medical interventions that do not promote the
recipient's best interests can be reasonable in a clinical trial but not in
ordinary medical care. 96 In both cases, the critical questions are
whether the risks are necessary components of the underlying
activity, and whether it is reasonable to assume that those
participating in the activity have knowingly agreed to be exposed to
the risks that are involved.
The discussion in Part II established the first of these
requirements, i.e., that deviating from the best interests of individual
subjects is often unavoidable when conducting a randomized
controlled trial.97 As for the second requirement, written consent
forms provide some evidence that individuals who enroll in clinical
trials are aware of the dangers, but a signature on a form does not
necessarily mean that the subjects genuinely understood or accepted
all of the risks. 98 Aside from the consent form, however, several other
96. Consent also can alter the nature of physicians' obligations outside of research. For ex-
ample, in Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987), the court found sufficient evidence to
allow the jury to consider assumption of risk as a defense to a malpractice claim against a physi-
cian who treated a cancer patient with unconventional therapy. In that case, however, the pur-
pose of the treatment was to benefit the patient, and, in addition to providing unconventional
treatment, the physician expressly advised the patient to have her tumor surgically removed. Id.
at 989. Because the physician was seeking to promote the medical interests of the individual
patient, the court did not have to consider whether consent could ever justify tradeoffs between
the patient's best interests and broader societal goals.
97. See discussion supra Part II.
98. See infra notes 116-124 and accompanying text. Outside of research, signed informed
consent forms can sometimes establish a presumption that the patient provided informed con-
sent, but the presumption is rebuttable. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (2004). Ar-
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factors make it reasonable to believe that at least some subjects enroll
in clinical trials with knowledge of the risks and a willingness to
accept them. Identifying such subjects requires understanding the
factors that can make enrolling in clinical trials a rational choice.
First, in many cases, the risks associated with deviating from
the subject's best interests are not very significant. 99 In a study
comparing a new drug and a placebo for the treatment of a minor
condition like mild heartburn, for example, there is little reason to be
concerned that subjects in the placebo arm will have to forego
treatment for the condition during the course of the study. Even if
standard treatment for the condition is available, the only risk
associated with foregoing standard treatment is likely to be minor,
short-term discomfort.
At the same time, subjects may receive medical benefits from
participating in research that make the loss of a therapeutic
relationship an acceptable tradeoff. For example, while it is often
possible to receive experimental interventions outside of a protocol, 100
sometimes participating in research may be the only way to obtain
access to a promising new drug or therapy.10 1 In addition, there is
some evidence that simply participating in a clinical trial can lead to
better medical outcomes - even for individuals who are randomized
guably, if a subject's explicit agreement to accept the inherent risks of research can be estab-
lished, whether through the consent form or otherwise, the analytical framework would shift
from primary implied assumption of risk to express assumption of risk. As discussed above, un-
der primary implied assumption of risk, the plaintiffs willingness to participate in an inherently
dangerous activity is used as a factor to consider in assessing the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's behavior. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. Under express assumption of risk,
by contrast, the reasonableness of the activity is not relevant, since the plaintiff has essentially
contracted away the right to be treated non-negligently. See Davenport, 508 S.E.2d at 570 (ex-
plaining that "the rule remains that express assumption of risk continues as an absolute defense
in an action for negligence"). However, courts will not apply express assumption of risk in situa-
tions where allowing individuals to contract away the right to be treated non-negligently would
violate public policy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 496B (1965). As argued in Part
III.B. infra, there are strong public policy reasons to limit the risks to which human subjects are
exposed, regardless of whether particular individuals might be willing to accept those risks if
asked to do so. See infra notes 136-148 and accompanying text. Thus, the application of express
assumption of risk would be unwarranted in this context.
99. Most research is actually not very risky. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND
REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 39 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that, in most cases, "it is not par-
ticularly hazardous to be a research subject").
100. Menikoff, supra note 58, at 63-64.
101. For example, if a drug has not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration for
any purpose, the only way to obtain access to the drug would be to participate in a clinical trial.
Id. at 66.
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into a placebo control arm. 10 2 Although a recent study suggests that
this "inclusion benefit" applies in only a small minority of trials,10 3 the
fact that it exists at all suggests that foregoing a therapeutic
relationship with a treating physician does not always reduce one's
chances of achieving a good medical result.
Even when subjects do not receive medical benefits from
participating in research, they may welcome the opportunity to do
something altruistic.10 4 While altruistic motivations for participating
in research can exist in a variety of circumstances, they are especially
likely in certain types of situations. For example, in studies of
conditions that have a genetic component, even subjects who do not
stand to receive a direct medical benefit from participating may be
motivated to participate by the prospect of future benefits to their
family members.10 5 In addition, individuals with medical conditions
around which social or political advocacy movements have emerged,
such as HIV/AIDS or breast cancer, may feel a special affinity with
others who have the same condition. The same may be true for
individuals with rare diseases, particularly when many of the
individuals who have the disease know one another through support
groups or other connections. This shared sense of purpose may lead to
a desire to do something beneficial for the affected community, even if
doing so involves taking on some risk.
10 6
Another reason some people participate in clinical trials is
simply to gain access to some form of health care.10 7 In a society
without universal health care access, clinical trials, which are
typically subsidized by the sponsors of the research, may be the least
expensive way to get medical attention, particularly for people without
102. John D. Lantos, The "Inclusion Benefit" in Clinical Trials, 134 J. PEDIATRICS 130, 130
(1999) (suggesting that such benefits may be due to factors such as "selection bias, placebo ef-
fects, and adherence to well-defined protocols").
103. Jeffrey M. Peppercorn et al., Comparison of Outcomes in Cancer Patients Treated
Within and Outside Clinical Trials: Conceptual Framework and Structured Review, 363 LANCET
263, 267-69 (2004).
104. Nancy E. Kass et al., Trust: The Fragile Foundation of Contemporary Biomedical Re-
search, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 25, 27 (noting that some individuals cite al-
truism as an important factor in their decision to become research subjects). It is possible that
some individuals who attribute their decisions to altruism are actually driven by more self-
interested motivations. See Claus Wedekind, Give and Ye Shall Be Recognized, 280 SCIENCE
2070, 2070-71 (1998) (using game theory to explain why it is often in an individual's best inter-
ests to engage in presumably altruistic behavior). Nonetheless, "[a] substantial body of evidence"
suggests that genuine altruism "is prevalent among humans." Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for
Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 175 n.39 (citing sources).
105. See Kass et al., supra note 104, at 25, 27.
106. See id. at 27 (quoting survey respondent with a hereditary condition who expressed a
desire to participate in research in order to help others in her family).
107. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 20, at 87.
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health insurance. That some people assume the risks of research
primarily because they lack other options for obtaining medical
treatment is certainly troubling.108  However, until this country
develops a more equitable health care system, participating in a
clinical trial, despite the inherent risks, may be a rational decision for
persons who otherwise would go without any medical care at all.
That is not to say that the limited health care options available
to some subjects should be ignored in assessing the appropriateness of
deviating from subjects' best interests. On the contrary, the fact that
some subjects have few viable alternatives to participating in research
underscores the importance of supplementing the consent requirement
with other mechanism for safeguarding subjects' wellbeing. However,
a blanket policy of precluding individuals from consenting to
deviations from their best interests would do more harm than good for
those who depend on the availability of clinical trials as a means of
obtaining free or low-cost medical attention. For such individuals, the
risks of foregoing the undivided attention of a treating physician are
more theoretical than real, and they may pale in comparison to the
risks of going entirely without any medical care.
If, as the preceding discussion suggests, deviations from the
best interests of individual subjects can sometimes be justified, there
is no need to reconcile clinical trials with the therapeutic obligations of
treating physicians. This conclusion has two important implications.
First, it suggests that clinical equipoise should not be considered a
prerequisite for all types of research. If subjects can consent to
deviations from their best interests under at least some sets of
circumstances, it is not essential that subjects always receive
interventions that are at least as promising as the existing standard of
care. Second, if we reject the physician-patient relationship as a
model for defining researchers' obligations, it becomes necessary to
define researchers' duties in some other way. The next Part considers,
and ultimately rejects, one such model, which takes a position
diametrically opposed to the approach described above.
B. The Other Extreme: Researchers as "Scientists Only"
If researchers need not be exclusively committed to subjects'
best interests, may they simply ignore them? In other words, if we
reject the physician-patient relationship as the model for defining
108. Cf. Gina Kolata and Kurt Eichenwald, For the Uninsured, Drug Trials Are Medicine,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1999, at Al (pointing out that individuals who enroll in clinical trials be-




researchers' duties, is the alternative to view the researcher-subject
relationship as an arm's-length transaction, in which neither party
has any obligation to look out for the other's individual needs? A few
commentators appear to endorse such an approach. One researcher,
for example, maintains that "[t]here is a divergence in the goals of the
physician and the researcher, because the latter is not obligated to act
in the best interests of the subject."10 9 According to this commentator,
researchers' duties are limited to promoting "scientific correctness...
tempered by many features such as informed consent, no duress, and
freedom to withdraw." 10 In this view, as long as the subjects' consent
is informed and voluntary, the researcher is free to focus exclusively
on the pursuit of generalizable knowledge, without any concern for
individual subjects' medical needs.
Unlike the view of research ethics described in the previous
Section, this "scientific correctness" approach recognizes that research
is different from ordinary medical treatment. However, its conclusion
that researchers have no obligation to act in the best interests of
subjects errs too far in the opposite direction. The point of the
previous Section was that consensual deviations from subjects' best
interest should be presumptively acceptable, not that consent always
justifies actions that undermine subjects' medical needs.
There are two reasons to be skeptical about the use of consent
to justify any conceivable deviation from subjects' medical interests.
First, the process of informed consent to research suffers from
significant limitations.111 Going through the ritual of consent1 12 is
therefore no guarantee that a subject's agreement to enroll in a study
is actually informed in any meaningful sense. In addition, even when
the validity of subjects' consent to participate in a study cannot
reasonably be doubted, the process of human experimentation
implicates interests beyond those of the individuals who agree to be
subjects. 1 3 Just as the law places limits on the enforceability of
consensual transactions in other situations,11 4 there are important
109. C. Barbara Mueller, Breast Cancer Trials on Trial: A Case of Conflicting Ethical Inter-
ests, 75 CANCER 2403, 2404 (1995) (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. See infra notes 116.124 and accompanying text.
112. Cf. Paul Root Wolpe, The Thiumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A Sociological
View, in BIOETHICS AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ENTERPRISE OF
BIOETHICS 38, 50 (Raymond DeVries & Hanardan Subedi eds.,1998) (describing the process of
informed consent as a "ritual of trust" that has taken on greater importance as genuine trust be-
tween physicians and patients has eroded).
113. See infra notes 132-146 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
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public policy reasons to limit the nature and extent of the risks that
human subjects are asked to accept.
First, the fact that individuals may rationally consent to the
inherent risks of research in some situations 15 does not mean that
everyone who agrees to be a research subject genuinely understands
what he or she is being asked to do. Part of the problem is that the
process of obtaining informed consent to research is often poorly
conducted. In many studies, the primary focus is on getting
individuals to sign a piece of paper, with little real interaction
between prospective subjects and members of the research team.
1 6
Yet, even when the consent process is carried out more
conscientiously, subjects often fail to grasp what enrolling in a clinical
trial really means. A variety of studies have documented that
individuals routinely fail to understand the distinction between
research and ordinary medical treatment, even after receiving
accurate information during the process of informed consent.1 7 For
example, even when subjects seem to understand the concept of
randomized treatment assignments in the abstract, they may refuse to
believe that their own treatment will actually be assigned based on
the flip of a coin. In general, many subjects harbor a "therapeutic
misconception"11 8 about the nature of research; they believe that,
despite the disclaimers, clinical trials are really designed to promote
subjects' own medical interests, in addition to producing knowledge for
the potential benefit of patients in the future. 119
It is not difficult to understand why subjects might have such a
mistaken perspective about the nature and goals of biomedical
research. 120 The process of informed consent to research does not
occur in a vacuum; instead, it takes place in a society that views
115. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
116. BERG ET AL., supra note 44, at 287.
117. See id. at 288-90.
118. Id. at 288.
119. Id.; see also Nancy M. P. King, Defining and Describing Benefit Appropriately in Clini-
cal Trials, 28 J..L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 334-36 (2000) (discussing subjects' tendency to overesti-
mate the therapeutic benefits they will receive from research). In a recent empirical study of the
therapeutic misconception, 61.8 percent of subjects were found to have exhibited the phenome-
non; 31.1 percent "expressed inaccurate beliefs regarding the degree of individualization of their
treatment," while 51.1 percent "manifested an unreasonable belief in the nature or likelihood of
benefit, given the methods of the study in which they were enrolled." Paul S. Appelbaum et al.,
Therapeutic Misconception in Clinical Research: Frequency and Risk Factors, IRB: ETHICS IN
HUM. RES., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 1, 4-5.
120. In fact, it is quite common for individuals to underestimate the risks and overestimate
the benefits of potentially dangerous activities. See generally Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex,
Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59 (dis-
cussing common cognitive biases that tend to distort individuals' evaluations of risk).
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physicians as "single-mindedly devoted to advancing one's health."121
Under these circumstances, a subject encountering a physician-
typically someone dressed in a white coat, wearing a stethoscope, and
working in a hospital-may find it difficult to accept that what is
going on is not actually designed to promote the subject's medical
wellbeing. 122 This is particularly true for people who are referred to
clinical trials as a means of obtaining state-of-the-art therapy, as is
the case for many patients with cancer or AIDS, conditions for which
participation in clinical trials has effectively become part of the
standard of care. 23 In these circumstances, even the most carefully
designed informed consent process may be incapable of overcoming
subjects' expectation that enrolling in research is part of their
individualized care.
In addition to increasing subjects' expectation of receiving
benefits from research, the therapeutic misconception also may lead
subjects to underestimate the risks that clinical research involves.
Many people assume that physicians would not expose them to serious
health risks, an assumption that can lead subjects to discount the
possibility of experiencing an injury.1 24 As such, despite the disclosure
of risks as part of the informed consent process, it is unreasonable to
assume that subjects necessarily appreciate the potential for harm.
Scholars and policymakers have proposed a variety of
approaches to dealing with the therapeutic misconception. For
example, some have proposed the use of "consent monitors" in
particularly complicated or high-risk studies, to help ensure that the
subject actually understands what the study entails.125 Others have
suggested that subjects in clinical trials should be paid to participate,
so that they realize that they are providing a service rather than
121. Paul S. Applebaum, Clarifying the Ethics of Clinical Research: A Path Toward Avoiding
the Therapeutic Misconception, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Spring 2002, at 22, 23.
122. See Kass et al., supra note 104, at 26 (noting that, according to surveys of research sub-
jects, many individuals "placed a good deal of trust in the hospitals in which they were receiving
care" and believed that, "if they're conducting this research at that hospital, it must be state-of-
the-art").
123. In fact, for certain conditions, individuals may "have little access to interventions of any
sort outside research." King, supra note 119, at 339 (noting that "most children with cancer are
enrolled in research because the community of practice agreed to develop an all-encompassing
research agenda in order to make progress against the disease"). As Rebecca Dresser argues,
patient advocacy organization also may unintentionally contribute to the therapeutic misconcep-
tion by implying that enrolling in a study is the best way for patients to receive cutting-edge
treatment. REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS SALVATION: PATIENT ADVOCACY AND
RESEARCH ETHICS 47-48 (2002).
124. BERG ETAL., supra note 44, at 289.
125. See, e.g., RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 153-54.
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receiving standard medical care. 126 Yet, despite the potential benefits
of these proposals, individuals' expectations about the role of
physicians appear to be too deeply ingrained to assume that these
changes would eliminate subjects' tendency to conflate research with
ordinary medical care.
Some commentators have suggested that researchers' own
sense of obligation to promote subjects' medical interests is partly to
blame for subjects' confusion about the nature of clinical research. Jay
Katz, for example, criticizes researchers for acting as if they were
entering into physician-patient relationships with subjects, despite the
fact that the researcher-subject relationship is not designed to address
the subject's medical needs. 127 In so doing, researchers "unwittingly
become double agents with conflicting loyalties,"'128 making it difficult
for subjects to understand the difference between research and clinical
care. Katz suggests that the way to remedy this problem is for
researchers to "see themselves as scientists only and not as doctors."'129
By changing their self-perception to one that more accurately reflects
their true relationship with subjects, Katz argues, researchers can
help subjects understand what enrolling in a clinical trial is really
about.
Katz's proposal is similar to the view that the researcher's duty
is limited to the promotion of "scientific correctness."'130 However, it is
motivated not by a desire to free researchers from the burdens of
therapeutic obligations, but by an effort to ensure that subjects'
consent is genuinely voluntary and informed. Yet, the danger is that,
unless the approach is completely successful-i.e., unless researchers'
efforts to see themselves as "scientists only" completely disabuse
subjects of their expectation of individualized therapeutic attention-
it may simply make research more dangerous for subjects. Given the
deeply-ingrained nature of the therapeutic misconception, subjects
would likely continue to conflate research with a therapeutic
relationship, but their expectations would be even more misguided, as
researchers would now be making a conscious effort to abandon any
sense of obligation to promote subjects' medical needs. 13'
126. See Miller & Brody, supra note 70, at 19, 26. For additional suggestions of methods to
reduce the therapeutic misconception, see Rebecca Dresser, The Ubiquity and Utility of the
Therapeutic Misconception, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POLY 271 (2002).
127. Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 7, 28-29
(1993).
128. Id. at 28.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 110 and accompanying text.
131. In addition, "[a] complete purging of the therapeutic milieu of clinical research would
likely undercut the motivation of patients to volunteer" for clinical trials, as well as making clini-
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Freeing researchers from any obligation to promote subjects'
medical welfare also ignores the larger societal interests in overseeing
clinical trials. While informed consent is certainly an important
criterion in determining the ethical acceptability of human subject
research, it is not the only consideration. In the Belmont Report,132 an
influential document published in 1979 by the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, the emphasis on informed consent was accompanied by an
equally strong recognition of other important values. For example,
the report emphasized the importance of beneficence, a principle that
would prohibit "brutal or inhumane treatment" regardless of
consent.133 It also stressed that justice requires a fair distribution of
the benefits and burdens of research, which may require that "some
classes of potential subjects ... may be involved as research subjects,
if at all, only on certain conditions,"' 134 again notwithstanding those
individuals' willingness to consent. Similarly, the Nuremberg Code
states that "[n]o experiment should be conducted where there is an a
priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur;
except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental
physicians also serve as subjects."'3 5 These upper limits on risk do not
depend on the presence or absence of consent.
As an example of a situation in which consent might be an
insufficient justification for deviating from a subject's medical
interests, consider a subject who experiences severe and persistent
headaches after receiving a lumbar puncture. 136 Despite the painful
and potentially dangerous implications of this adverse reaction, the
subject may still want to continue in the study-even if doing so
means receiving additional lumbar punctures-because she is
sincerely committed to helping the research succeed. Nonetheless,
even if this subject actually understands and accepts the risks of
continuing in the study, there are a variety of public policy reasons for
overriding her consent.
First, allowing subjects to proceed in a study after experiencing
significant adverse reactions has implications not only for the
cal research "less attractive" for those physician-investigators who are genuinely concerned
about promoting subjects' medical wellbeing. Franklin G. Miller et al., Professional Integrity in
Clinical Research, 280 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1449, 1451 (1998).
132. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 13.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Coun-
cil Law No. 10 § 5 (1946-1949) [NUREMBERG CODE], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/nuremberg.html.
136. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text..
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individual subjects but also for society at large. Just as one of the
legacies of the notorious Tuskegee syphilis study has been a
deep-seated distrust of physicians by African-Americans, 137 knowledge
that researchers sometimes perform painful interventions on subjects
past the point of serious injury may cause the public to lose trust in
the integrity of the medical profession. If the result is that some
people become reluctant to seek medical attention, the consequences
would be serious for both those individuals' own health and,
potentially, the health of the public, to the extent that some people
forego treatment for communicable diseases. In addition, it could
exacerbate the public's already growing distrust of the safety of
research, 138 making it difficult to generate adequate enrollments even
in studies that do not pose significant risks.13 9
Second, there are non-utilitarian reasons for limiting the risks
imposed on individuals in the name of scientific progress. As Richard
Garnett has argued, "Dignity may require respecting autonomy-as-
free-choice in some circumstances, but at the same time it may also
require objective limits on practices, behaviors, procedures, and
institutions which are in themselves inconsistent with the dignity of
persons."140  The notion that certain rights are too significant to be
alienated by agreement is a consistent theme running through many
areas of law. To list just a few examples, consent is not a defense to
most crimes, 41 courts will not enforce agreements that violate public
policy, 142 and certain statutory rights are not waivable by the
137. James H. Jones, The Tuskegee Legacy: AIDS and the Black Community, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.- Dec. 1992, at 38. In the Tuskegee study, researchers observed hundreds of
poor African-American men with syphilis over several decades to determine the natural course of
the disease. Not only did the researchers fail to offer treatment to the men, even when penicillin
became widely available, but they also actively sought to prevent the men from obtaining treat-
ment from other sources. See generally Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1978, at 21.
138. See Giselle Corbie-Smith et al., Distrust, Race, and Research, 162 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 2458, 2460 (2002) (finding that nearly 80 percent of African-Americans and 52 percent of
Caucasian-Americans believed that they or "people like them" could be used as "guinea pigs" for
medical research without their consent).
139. See Goldner, supra note 10, at 381 (arguing that the loss of public trust in research "has
implications for the willingness of individuals to participate as subjects in research, for the pub-
lic to financially support research efforts, and ultimately for our very ability to continue to alle-
viate suffering, conquer disease, and treat painful medical conditions").
140. Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of
Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 488 (1996).
141. See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility Of Desert, 76 B.U.
L. Rev. 201, 204 n.21 (1996) ("[C]onsent is rarely a defense in criminal law.").
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981) ("A promise or other term of
an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unen-
forceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public
policy against the enforcement of such terms.").
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individual.143 Some of these limits on consent are designed partly to
prevent individuals from making rash decisions they may later
regret, 144 while others, such as the federal prohibition on the sale of
human organs, 145 reflect a desire to avoid the commodification of the
human body and, ultimately, of persons. 146 In general, these limits
demonstrate that public policy in this country does not support
unbridled autonomy; in some cases, acceding to individuals' choices
may conflict with other values that society holds dear.
A final justification for placing limits on consent to particularly
dangerous activities is the difficulty of identifying which individuals'
decisions are genuinely informed and voluntary. Even assuming that
some subjects would genuinely understand and accept the risks of
continuing in a study after experiencing serious adverse reactions,
many other subjects' consent would undoubtedly be influenced by the
therapeutic misconception-i.e., the assumption that research is
guided by the same patient-centered ethos as ordinary medical care. 147
Refusing to accept anyone's consent under these circumstances can be
justified by the difficulty of accurately distinguishing the former group
from the latter. In other words, a refusal to accept consent to serious
deviations from subjects' medical interests serves a prophylactic
function; although potentially overinclusive, it guarantees that no one
will be exposed to significant risks based on misguided expectations
rather than authentic consent. While such a rule might frustrate the
autonomous choices of a small group of people, it can be justified when
the danger of inadequate consent is particularly high.
148
143. For example, the consumer's right to a three-day rescission period for certain transac-
tions governed by the federal Truth in Lending Act is generally not waivable. See 15 U.S.C. §
1635 (2000).
144. For example, policies precluding pregnant women from making binding agreements to
give up their babies for adoption are based largely on this rationale. See, e.g., Sullivan v.
Mooney, 407 So.2d 559, 563 (Ala. 1981); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 439 N.Y.S.2d 255, 259-60
(Sup Ct. 1981).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2004).
146. See Mark F. Anderson, The Future of Organ Transplantation: From Where Will New
Donors Come, To Whom Will Their Organs Go?, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 294-301 (1995) (outlining
arguments against developing a market in organs). See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Pater-
nalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983) (arguing that "[slome paternalistic
limitations on contractual freedom are best explained by considerations of economic efficiency
and distributive fairness, others by the idea of personal integrity, and a third set of limitations
by the familiar, though poorly understood, notion of sound judgment").
147. See supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
148. Similar concerns about the difficulty of distinguishing between authentic and inauthen-
tic consent are one of primary justifications for prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide. See
Carl H. Coleman, The "Disparate Impact" Argument Reconsidered: Making Room for Justice in
the Assisted Suicide Debate, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 17, 18-23 (2002) (weighing the risks of inau-
thentic consent to assisted suicide against the potential benefits of the practice); cf. Margaret
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Having rejected both the physician-patient relationship and
the pure scientific investigator as models for defining the obligations
of researchers, where does that leave us? The next Section attempts
to answer that question by examining the law's treatment of other
types of relationships characterized by a similarly high degree of trust
and dependency. This examination provides the basis for constructing
a middle ground between the two all-or-nothing positions outlined
above.
V. BRIDGING THE GAP: FIDUCIARY LAW AS A MODEL FOR THE
RESEARCHER-SUBJECT RELATIONSHIP
Recognizing the inadequacy of the all-or-nothing approaches
described in the previous Sections, a few commentators have called for
a more balanced definition of researchers' obligations. Franklin Miller
and colleagues, for example, write that "[wle need to cultivate a
conception of the moral identity of the physician-investigator that
integrates the roles of the clinician and the scientist without giving
predominance to the one or the other."149 Thus, researchers "should be
prepared to sacrifice scientific rigor when necessary to protect patient
volunteers from exposure to severe suffering or disproportionate risks
of harm,"150 but they also should be permitted to ask subjects to
tolerate "minor risks and mild-to-moderate discomfort ... to conform
to scientific protocols." 151
Elsewhere, Miller and Howard Brody have suggested that,
rather than modeling researchers' duties to subjects on either the
physician-patient relationship or the ethical obligations of scientific
investigators, the emphasis should be on avoiding the "exploitation" of
human research subjects. 152  Drawing on ethical principles for
research developed by a group of bioethicists at the National
Institutes of Health, 153 Miller and Brody suggest that this
"non-exploitation framework" requires assurances of "scientific or
social value and scientific validity," "fair subject selection," "favorable
risk-benefit ratio," and "independent review, informed consent, and
respect for enrolled research participants."'1 54
Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1909-11 (1987) (discussing prophy-
lactic justifications for prohibitions on consensual sales).
149. Miller et al., supra note 131, at 1452.
150. Id. at 1453.
151. Id.
152. Miller & Brody, supra note 70, at 26.
153. See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical? 283 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 2701 (2000) (setting forth seven basic principles for ethical research).
154. Miller & Brody, supra note 70, at 26-27.
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These commentators' efforts to construct a new definition of
researchers' obligations that recognizes both the differences and
similarities between clinical research and ordinary medical treatment
is a welcome development. However, their principle of
''non-exploitation," while useful as a general description of the ideals
to which researchers should aspire in their interactions with human
subjects, provides little guidance for resolving specific situations in
which the pursuit of scientific integrity and the best interests of
individual subjects collide. Many of their principles simply
incorporate the existing regulatory requirements that IRBs apply in
reviewing research protocols, including the regulatory standard for
risk-benefit assessment, under which risks to subjects are balanced
against the potential societal benefits associated with particular
studies. 155 For example, in defending a placebo-controlled trial of an
antidepression medication, Miller and Brody comment that "risks to
participants ... were justifiable by the anticipated value of the
knowledge to be gained from the research." 156 Yet, if we take seriously
the notion that physician-researchers may not completely abdicate
their responsibility for the best interests of individual subjects-a
position implicit in Miller's insistence that researchers "integrate the
roles of the clinician and the scientist"157-the critical issue is
determining when risks become unacceptable despite a study's
potential to generate valuable knowledge. To the extent Miller and
Brody address this question, it is in their directive to ensure "respect
for enrolled research participants" by, for example, adopting
"procedures for monitoring subjects for possible risk of harm."158 This
requirement suggests that researchers have some obligation to
promote subjects' best interests even when doing so may undermine
the pursuit of generalizable knowledge. However, the meaning of
"respect," and its relationship to the regulatory standard for
risk-benefit assessment, is never made clear.
We are thus left with a dilemma: on the one hand, if clinical
research is different from ordinary medical treatment, researchers'
deviation from the best interests of individual subjects is not
necessarily problematic, provided there are valid reasons for
conducting the study and the subjects voluntarily agree to assume the
risks of foregoing individualized medical care. On the other hand,
deficiencies in the process of informed consent to research, combined
155. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
156. Miller & Brody, supra note 70, at 27.
157. Miller et al., supra note 131, at 1452.
158. Miller & Brody, supra note 70, at 27.
422 [Vol. 58:2:387
2005] DUTIES TO SUBJECTS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH 423
with the societal interest in overseeing the conduct of medical
professionals, suggest that researchers should not be permitted to
completely ignore the best interests of individual subjects, even if
protecting subjects' welfare may impede the production of
generalizable knowledge. The challenge is to define researchers'
duties in a manner that both recognizes subjects' presumptive
authority to consent to deviations from their best interests, while
carving out a limited duty of therapeutic attentiveness to which all
researchers must adhere.
Fortunately, this type of challenge is not unique to human
subject research. The function and limits of consent in relationships
characterized by trust and dependency also is a familiar theme in the
regulation of financial transactions, where the issue frequently arises
in dealings between individuals in fiduciary relationships. 
159
Consider, for example, a young adult who inherits property in the
form of a trust, which will be managed by a trustee until the
beneficiary reaches a certain age. The beneficiary stands in a highly
vulnerable position vis-A-vis the trustee, given that the trustee has
legal title to the property and the authority to manage it, while the
beneficiary may lack the maturity, financial acumen, or access to
information necessary to determine whether the trustee is managing
the property appropriately. The law regulates such situations to
ensure that the trustee does not pursue interests at odds with those of
the beneficiary, in part by limiting the legal effectiveness of the
beneficiary's consent. For example, if the trustee sells trust property
to a business in which she has significant interests-potentially
benefiting the trustee at the expense of getting the best price for the
property-the transaction may be voidable even if the beneficiary
consented to it.160 The law does not bar beneficiaries from consenting
to transactions in which trustees pursue conflicting interests, but it
requires additional indicia of fairness before the transaction will be
upheld. 161 In other fiduciary relationships, the law similarly imposes
limits on the beneficiary's power to authorize transactions in which
the fiduciary is pursuing competing interests, although the nature and
extent of those constraints differs depending on the type of
relationship involved.162
Admittedly, there are differences between the conflicts that
typically arise in relationships governed by fiduciary principles and
159. For a definition of fiduciary relationships, see infra notes 171-178.
160. See infra note 186-188, 198 and accompanying text.
161. See id.
162. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
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the conflicts inherent in clinical research. In traditional fiduciary
relationships, the underlying purpose of the relationship is to benefit
the beneficiary; in research, the primary goal is to develop
generalizable knowledge. In addition, conflicts in traditional fiduciary
relationships usually involve the fiduciary's effort to derive personal
advantages at the expense of the beneficiary; in research, the conflict
involves the researchers' pursuit of societal benefits in a manner that
compromises the subject's medical needs. 163 Nonetheless, the law's
treatment of the pursuit of self-interest by fiduciaries in financial
relationships provides a model for thinking about the power and limits
of consent in dependent relationships more generally. For one thing,
it calls into question the assumption that individuals in vulnerable
relationships are inherently incapable of consenting to actions that
are potentially inconsistent with their overall best interests. At the
same time, the fact that the legal effectiveness of consent is limited in
fiduciary relationships suggests that consent is not necessarily a
sufficient safeguard to protect vulnerable individuals from
exploitation and abuse. Ultimately, fiduciary principles can help
bridge the gap between the all-or-nothing views of researchers'
obligations outlined in Part III of this Article, by providing a
framework in which consent, while important, becomes just one of
several conditions necessary to justify deviations from the pursuit of
subjects' medical wellbeing.
The remainder of this Part begins by examining the legal
principles governing fiduciary relationships in three contexts-trusts,
corporations, and partnerships-particularly as applied to agreements
in which the beneficiary of the relationship seeks to authorize the
fiduciary to act in a manner that potentially conflicts with the
beneficiary's economic interests. It then considers how these
principles might be extrapolated to apply to the relationship between
researchers and subjects when conflicts arise between the pursuit of
scientific knowledge and subjects' medical wellbeing. Part V then
turns to the implications of a fiduciary approach to the researcher-
subject relationship for litigation in which subjects seek compensation
for research-related harms.
A. Loyalty and Consent in Fiduciary Relationships
Although fiduciary principles underlie numerous areas of the
law, they are "widely regarded as among the most indefinite,
163. These differences are explored in more detail infra text accompanying 242-243.
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imprecise, and elusive legal abstractions."' 164 At its heart, a fiduciary
relationship obligates one party to act "for the benefit of the other
party to the relation as to matters within the scope of the relation."165
A fiduciary relationship is therefore fundamentally different from an
ordinary arm's-length transaction, in which neither party has any
obligation to protect the other party's interests.1 66  Fiduciary
obligations typically arise in one of four circumstances:
(1) when one person places trust in the faithful integrity of another, who as a result
gains superiority or influence over the first; (2) when one person assumes control and
responsibility over another; (3) when one person has a duty to act for or give advice to
another on matters falling within the scope of the relationship; or (4) when there is a
specific relationship that has traditionally been recognized as involving fiduciary duties,
as with a lawyer and a client. 167
Traditional examples of fiduciary relationships include
"trustee-beneficiary, principal-agent, guardian-ward, attorney-client,
executor-estate beneficiary, partner-partner, director-corporation and
shareholders, and majority shareholder-minority shareholder.' 168
Fiduciary principles also have been applied to several "nontraditional"
relationships, including insurer-insured, priest-penitent, and
bank-customer. 69 When fiduciary principles are applied to these
nontraditional relationships, "[a] common theme ... is the relaxation
of one party's self-interested vigilance or independent judgment in
favor of the other party's protection, because the circumstances justify
the belief that the other is acting in the first party's best interests."' 70
Fiduciary obligations are usually divided into two components.
The first is the "duty of care," which requires fiduciaries to exercise
diligence in making decisions on behalf of the beneficiary. 171 The
second is the "duty of loyalty," which obligates the fiduciary to act in a
manner that promotes the best interests of the beneficiary, as opposed
164. Alan M. Weinberger, Expanding the Fiduciary Relationship Bestiary: Does Concurrent
Ownership Satisfy the Family Resemblance Test? 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1767, 1779 (1994).
165. 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5 (4th ed. 1987).
166. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that partner had a
duty to inform his copartner of a business opportunity arising out of their venture).
167. Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of Fiduciary Rela-
tionships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999)).
168. Id.
169. Id. (noting that fiduciary principles have been applied to such relationships only under
limited circumstances).
170. Id. at 22.
171. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors
violated their duty of care in evaluating a merger proposal and were therefore not entitled to
protection by the business judgment rule).
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to the fiduciary's own interests or those of another person or entity.
172
The duty of loyalty is most relevant to the present discussion; like the
physician's duty to promote the patient's medical best interests, the
fiduciary's duty of loyalty constrains the fiduciary's ability to take
actions that potentially conflict with the beneficiary's wellbeing.173
While all fiduciaries are obligated to promote the beneficiary's
best interests, the nature and scope of that obligation depends on the
type of relationship. At one extreme is the relationship between
trustee and beneficiary, in which self-dealing by the trustee-a
paradigmatic example of a breach of the duty of loyalty-is "virtually
prohibited."'174 Although the common law's absolute prohibition on
self-dealing transactions by trustees has been relaxed in some
contexts, 7 5 the circumstances in which trustees may pursue their own
interests at the potential expense of those of the beneficiary remain
extremely limited. Under Delaware law, for example, "a court will
uphold [a self-interested] transaction against a beneficiary's challenge
only if the trustee can show that the transaction was fair and that the
beneficiaries consented to the transaction after receiving full
disclosure of its terms."'7 6 Under this standard, even an objectively
fair transaction can be set aside if the beneficiary did not consent to
it,7 v and even with consent, a self-interested transaction will be
voidable if the trustee "failed to disclose material facts, used her
position of influence inappropriately, or conducted [the] transaction
unfairly."17
8
172. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) ("Essentially, the duty
of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes prece-
dence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared
by the stockholders generally."). The Delaware Supreme Court refers to a "triad of fiduciary du-
ties," in which a "duty of good faith" is added to the more common duties of care and loyalty. See,
e.g., Emerald Parts. v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (2001) (outlining the triad of duties). Despite this
formulation, however, "it is difficult to see how good faith as a concept is not encompassed within
the other legs of the 'triad' - i.e., how a director might be found to have breached his duty of good
faith without being either disloyal or insufficiently careful." DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL.,
DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.02 (1989).
173. See supra note 172.
174. Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557, 563 (Del. 1999) (placing the burden to prove the
fairness of a self-interested transaction on the trust executor).
175. See, e.g., id.
176. Id. (citing Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991)).
177. Boxx, supra note 167, at 20 n.132 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 20 n.127 (citations omitted). As stated by the drafters of the Restatement, Sec-
ond, of Trusts:
If the trustee acquires.., an interest [in the trust property] with the consent of the
beneficiary, the transaction cannot be set aside by the beneficiary if the beneficiary
was not under an incapacity, and had knowledge of his legal rights and of all material
facts which the trustee knew or should have known unless the trustee reasonably be-
lieved that the beneficiary knew them, and was not induced by the trustee by undue
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Traditionally, the rules governing other fiduciaries, including
directors of corporations and members of partnerships, reflected the
common-law prohibition on self-dealing by trustees. Thus, in the
corporate context, some early cases stated that self-interested
transactions by corporate directors were "per se voidab[le]," regardless
of their underlying fairness to the corporation, 179 although more recent
decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court suggest that the
common-law prohibition was never actually that strict.18 0 However,
the enactment of Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law,181 combined with decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court,18 2
have made it clear that a rule of per se voidability, to the extent it ever
applied, no longer is the standard for self-interested transactions by
corporate directors. Instead, Section 144 now provides that a
director's conflicting interest in a corporate transaction will not be
grounds for voiding the transaction if: (1) a majority of the
disinterested directors approve the transaction after full disclosure; (2)
a majority of the disinterested shareholders approve the transaction
after full disclosure; 8 3 or (3) the transaction is "fair to the corporation
as of the time it is authorized, approved or ratified."18 4 Although only
the third factor under Section 144 explicitly requires an assessment of
the fairness of the transaction, the Delaware courts have emphasized
that transactions approved by the disinterested directors and, in at
least some cases, transactions approved by the disinterested
shareholders, also remain subject to a fairness test.'8 5
influence or other improper means to enter into the transaction, and the transaction
was fair and reasonable. If any of these factors is not present, however, the benefici-
ary can set aside the transaction. The relation between the trustee and the beneficiary
being a fiduciary relation, the standard of conduct required of the trustee is higher
than that required of persons who are not in a fiduciary relation.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) TRUSTS § 170 cmt. w (1959).
179. See, e.g., Rothenburg v. Franklin Washington Trust Co., 13 A.2d 667, 671 (N.J. Ch.
1940).
180. Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987).
181. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2004).
182. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-15 (Del. 1983) (en banc) (advocating a
wide ranging "entire fairness" inquiry into the actions of corporate directors).
183. Although the statute does not specifically refer to "disinterested" shareholders, such a
requirement has effectively been read into the statute. See, e.g., In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc.
S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995) (stating that directors' decision to enter into
a transaction is protected by the business judgment rule when it has been ratified by a majority
of the disinterested shareholders); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221-22 (Del. Ch. 1976)
(same).
184. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2004).
185. See, e.g., In re Wheelabrator, 663 A.2d at 1203; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-15;
Fliegler, 361 A.2d at 221-22. However, approval by the disinterested directors or shareholders
"shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder
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While self-interested transactions by corporate directors
remain subject to legal scrutiny under Section 144, the restrictions on
self-dealing by corporate directors are far less rigorous than those
applicable to trustees. As one prominent treatise on Delaware
corporate law emphasizes, "the distinction between directors and
trustees is not merely 'technical.' "186 Instead, while "the role of a
trustee requires a nigh-single-minded, selfless dedication to the
interest of the trust estate and its beneficiaries," directors of
corporations "are not required by their duty of loyalty to eschew
self-interest entirely.'
18 7
The duty of loyalty required of partners also has its origins in
the strict fiduciary obligations applicable to trustees. Indeed, Judge
Cardozo's famous description of the obligations of partners--"[n]ot
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior" 188-drew explicitly on trust law principles.
8 9
The modern view of partners' fiduciary obligations, however, is more
relaxed. For example, under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act,
partners may contractually modify their fiduciary duties to one
another, including by placing limits on the scope of the duty of
loyalty.1 90 They may agree, ex ante, on "specific types or categories of
activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty,"1 9' and they "may
determine the standards by which the performance of the obligation
[of good faith and fair dealing] is to be measured."192 Partners also
have the option of authorizing or ratifying a specific transaction "that
otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty," provided full disclosure of
all material facts is made. 193 Nonetheless, the Revised Act retains
some limitations on partners' ability to modify their fiduciary duties to
one another. For example, ex ante modifications of the duty of loyalty
and the duty of good faith and fair dealing will be upheld only if they
are "not manifestly unreasonable."' 194 Moreover, while partners may
to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff." Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d
1110, 1117 (1994).
186. DREXLER ET AL., supra note 172, § 15.02.
187. Id.
188. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
189. See id. ("A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace.").
190. See Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partner-
ship Act, 73 B.U.L. REV. 523, 534, 539-544 (1993) (describing and criticizing the Act's shift to a
"contractarian" regime).
191. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(3)(i) (1997).
192. Id. § 103(b)(5).
193. Id. § 103(b)(3)(ii).
194. Id. § 103(b)(3)(i), (b)(5).
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contractually modify the duties of loyalty, and of good faith and fair
dealing, those duties "may not be eliminated" entirely.195
Thus, the concept of a fiduciary relationship is not a one-size-
fits-all category. Instead, the meaning of fiduciary obligations varies
depending on the type of relationship at issue, with significant
differences in the fiduciary's ability to pursue interests that
potentially conflict with those of the beneficiary. For example, under
trust law, the beneficiary's consent to a self-interested transaction by
the trustee is essential; 196  under corporate law, by contrast,
self-dealing by a director is acceptable even without the consent of the
disinterested directors or shareholders if the transaction is fair to the
corporation at the time it is approved. 197 The function of consent also
is different under the various legal standards. Under trust law, even
consensual self-dealing is unacceptable if the transaction is "conducted
unfairly,"'198 and the trustee bears the burden of proving the fairness of
the transaction. 199 Under corporate law, however, the approval of the
disinterested directors or the shareholders shifts the burden of
persuasion to the party challenging the transaction, who must
convince the trier of fact that the transaction was not objectively
fair. 200 Modern partnership law also makes it difficult to challenge
consensual modifications of the duty of loyalty. Ex ante modifications
of the duty of loyalty are voidable only if they are "manifestly
unreasonable," and specific consent to "known past or anticipated
violation of duty" essentially immunizes the transaction from
challenge regardless of whether it is fair.
201
Yet, despite the "variations in intensity'" 20 2 of fiduciary
relationships, certain core features of fiduciary obligations are similar
195. Id. § 103(b)(3), (b)(5); see also id. § 103 cmt. 4 (noting that the prohibition on eliminating
the duties of loyalty and of good faith and fair dealing "are intended to ensure a fundamental
core of fiduciary responsibility").
196. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 183-184 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
199. See Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557, 563 (Del. 1999) ("Under current Delaware
law, an interested transaction is not void but is voidable, and the court will uphold such a trans-
action against a beneficiary only if the trustee can show that the transaction was fair." (citing
Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991) (internal citations omitted)); cf. Schock v. Nash,
732 A.2d 217, 226 (Del. 1999) (holding that, in breach of fiduciary duty suit against attorney-in-
fact acting under power of attorney, attorney-in-fact bears the burden of persuasion).
200. See supra note 183-184 and accompanying text.
201. See REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103 cmt. 6 (noting that "consent to a known
past or anticipated violation of duty" is a method by which partners can "validate conduct that
might otherwise not satisfy the 'manifestly unreasonable' standard" that is normally applicable
to breaches of the duty of loyalty).
202. Weinberger, supra note 164, at 1782.
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in all circumstances. First, fiduciaries are presumptively required to
pursue only the best interests of the beneficiary; unlike a party in an
arm's-length transaction, the fiduciary is not supposed to pursue her
own interests or those of someone else. Second, the prohibition on
pursuing interests that potentially conflict with those of the
beneficiary is a presumptive obligation only. Even trustees, who are
subject to the strictest fiduciary obligations, are permitted to pursue
other interests if the beneficiary consents and the transaction is
ultimately fair. 203  Finally, the beneficiary's consent is generally
insufficient, in and of itself, to justify the fiduciary's pursuit of
interests potentially adverse to those of the beneficiary. While the
substantive standards and burdens of proof vary depending on the
nature of the relationship, in all fiduciary contexts consensual
self-dealing by the fiduciary is voidable under at least some
circumstances, ranging from the strict limits on the pursuit of
self-interest by trustees to the more relaxed rules applicable to
corporate directors and partners.
That some self-interested transactions by fiduciaries are
voidable even if the beneficiary has consented suggests that fiduciary
obligations are not, as some commentators have argued, 20 4 simply
implied contractual terms, or gap-filling provisions designed to mirror
what the parties would have agreed to had they actually negotiated
about the details of their mutual obligations.20 5 Instead, in many
situations, the obligation to promote the beneficiary's best interests
constrains the fiduciary's actions even when the beneficiary has
expressly authorized the fiduciary to pursue conflicting goals. These
constraints promote valuable societal purposes that a purely
contractual approach to fiduciary obligations would be incapable of
protecting. For example, that the duty of loyalty generally cannot be
completely eliminated by contract reinforces beneficiaries' ability to
trust that their interests will be protected despite the fiduciary's
disproportionate power and control over matters within the scope of
203. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J.L. & ECON. 425, 426 (1993) (arguing that the fiduciary "package" is contractual because the
"principal and agent enter into this understanding for a gain").
205. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253,
1275 (1999) ("[I]f the duty of loyalty was contractual, it would follow that the duty could be not
only limited but completely waived by agreement. Generally speaking, however, it cannot be.").
The fact that corporations may not limit or eliminate directors' personal liability for breaches of
the duty of loyalty, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004) (stating that a certificate of
incorporation may limit directors' personal liability, "provided that such provision shall not
eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to
the corporation or its shareholders"), further supports the view that core fiduciary obligations
exist independent of the parties' implicit or explicit intentions.
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the relationship. 206 Similarly, this constraint avoids the danger of
"exploitation and abuse" that might arise if the law granted
beneficiaries an absolute right to "opt out of fiduciary duties" with no
limits on the enforceability of the beneficiary's consent. 207
At the same time, by permitting beneficiaries to consent to
some transactions that might otherwise be considered breaches of the
fiduciary's duty of loyalty, the law appropriately recognizes that the
fiduciary's pursuit of conflicting interests need not always cause the
beneficiary harm. Moreover, refusing to enforce any consensual devia-
tions from the single-minded pursuit of the beneficiary's best
interests would be inconsistent with the emphasis on individual
autonomy that animates our entire legal system.208  Respect for
autonomy suggests that even individuals in the type of vulnerable
relationships that trigger fiduciary obligations should have the
freedom to sacrifice the fiduciary's undivided loyalty, provided they
have full information and there are no reasons to believe that the
transaction is unfair. Permitting parties to structure their
relationships free of excessive limitations also arguably enhances
efficiency, by facilitating socially beneficial transactions that a more
restrictive regime would preclude.
B. Fiduciary Principles Applied to the Researcher-Subject Relationship
1. Are Researchers Fiduciaries?
The closest a court has come to holding that the researcher-
subject relationship imposes fiduciary obligations is the Maryland
Supreme Court's decision in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute,20 9
which found that researchers conducting a study on lead paint
poisoning in inner-city households most likely had a duty to warn
children in the households when blood tests revealed that the children
had elevated lead levels. In reaching this decision, the court found
that, in addition to a contractual duty to warn stemming from
agreements signed by the researchers, a duty also might exist based
206. See Eisenberg, supra note 205, at 1275 ("[The critical role of trust in the success of the
corporate system would be significantly undermined if the law sent a message that the duty of
loyalty was essentially a contractual duty, not a duty imposed by law.").
207. Vestal, supra note 190, at 562.
208. As one commentator notes, "[t]he altruistic norm of fiduciary duty runs counter to cher-
ished principles of rugged individualism." Weinberger, supra note 164, at 1780-81.
209. 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001).
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on the "special relationship" that "normally exists between researcher
and subject.
'210
A "special relationship" is a tort-law concept used to determine
when one person has an affirmative duty to protect others from risks
not of the person's own creation.211  For example, the special
relationship between lifeguards and beach-goers explains why a
lifeguard has a duty to rescue a drowning swimmer, while a person
sunbathing on the beach is free to stand around and watch the
swimmer drown.212 While the Grimes court's use of the term "special
relationship" indicates that researchers have a heightened duty to
protect the best interests of subjects, the concept of a "special
relationship" and a "fiduciary obligation" are not necessarily the same.
An innkeeper, for example, has a special relationship-based duty to
come to the aid of an injured guest on the premises, 213 but does not
have a fiduciary-based duty of loyalty to pursue solely the guest's
interests and eschew personal gain.
Two other courts have discussed the application of fiduciary
principles to biomedical research, but both of those cases involved
situations distinguishable from the clinical trials with which this
Article is concerned. The first, Moore v. Regents of the University of
California,2 4 held that a physician who extracted tissue from his
patient in the course of medical treatment had a fiduciary obligation
to inform the patient that some of the tissue would be used for
biomedical research that could lead to significant profits for the
physician. 215  Because that case involved a physician treating a
patient in a non-research setting, it does not resolve the question of
whether a fiduciary relationship exists between researchers and
subjects in clinical trials. The second case, Greenberg v. Miami
Children's Hospital Research Institute,216  rejected a breach-of-
fiduciary-duty claim brought by individuals who donated tissue to
210. Id. at 858. See generally Diane E. Hoffman & Karen H. Rothenberg, Whose Duty Is It
Anyway? The Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications for Public Health Research, 6 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 109 (2002) (focusing on "the legal duty of researchers and the role of
tort law in mediating between the need for advances in public health research and compensating
injured research subjects").
211. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (outlining several categories of relation-
ships giving rise to a duty to protect).
212. See, e.g., S & C Company v. Horne, 235 S.E.2d 456, 459-61 (Va. 1977) (finding defendant
apartment complex liable for the death of a swimmer where a lifeguard employee did not notice
the drowning because he was talking with his friends by the side of the pool).
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 314A (1977) (specifically listing innkeepers as
an example of a special relationship giving rise to a duty to protect).
214. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
215. Id. at 480-83.
216. 264 F. Supp.2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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researchers who were seeking to uncover the genetic mutations
associated with Canavan Disease. The tissue donors sued after
learning that the researchers had obtained a patent on their
discoveries and were using the patent to restrict public access to
Canavan disease testing, rather than keeping the fruits of the
research in the public domain. 217 Because the tissue donors never
received any medical interventions, the case was distinguishable from
clinical trials, which involve the provision of drugs or other forms of
medical care. 21
8
Despite the absence of directly-applicable precedent, a few
commentators have concluded that the researcher-subject relationship
is fiduciary in nature. Richard Delgado and Helen Leskovac, for
example, have argued that "researchers, whether physicians or not,
are like other professionals charged with fiduciary duties."219  In
reaching this conclusion, they point out that prospective research
subjects are "likely to view the relationship in terms of expectations
derived from the typical physician-patient relationship. 22 °  In
addition, they note that research subjects are often "poorly equipped
to evaluate the researcher's performance," that "[t]hey frequently
depend upon the greater skill or knowledge of the researcher to fulfill
their goals," and that "they must trust the researcher to protect their
interests."221  Other commentators have likewise concluded that the
researcher-subject relationship has fiduciary characteristics. 22
217. Id. at 1067-68.
218. Indeed, the court expressly distinguished tissue donors from "objects of human experi-
mentation." Id. at 1071. This distinction is at odds with the federal regulations on human sub-
ject research, under which individuals donating tissue directly to a researcher would clearly fit
within the definition of a "human subject." See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2004) (defining "human
subject" as "a living individual about whom an investigator.., conducting research obtains ...
data through intervention or interaction with the individual").
219. Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation:
Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 110
(1986).
220. Id. at 109.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Angela R. Holder, Do Researchers and Subjects Have a Fiduciary Relationship?
IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, Jan. 1982, at 6 (answering yes to the question
posed in the title); Richard S. Saver, Critical Care Research and Informed Consent, 75 N.C. L.
REV. 205, 222 (1996) ("Although the case law has not specifically addressed the question, the
medical researcher likely has a fiduciary relationship to the subject just as the doctor has to his
or her patient."); cf. Henry S. Richardson and Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of
Medical Researchers: An Ethical Framework for Thinking about the Clinical Care that Research-
ers Owe Their Subjects, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 25 (arguing that, as an ethi-
cal matter, researchers have "limited but substantive fiduciary obligations" to subjects, which in
some circumstances obligate the researcher to diagnose and possibly provide care for conditions
unrelated to the research).
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Some commentators, by contrast, have criticized the
application of fiduciary principles to the researcher-subject
relationship, emphasizing that the purpose of the relationship is not to
promote the best interests of the subject. 223 Certainly, the fact that
the purpose of research is to produce generalizable knowledge
distinguishes the researcher-subject relationship from traditional
fiduciary situations. For example, trust relationships are created in
order to manage the beneficiary's property, and corporate directors
serve in order to benefit the corporation's affairs. However, the
application of fiduciary principles does not always turn on whether the
more powerful party enters into the relationship primarily for the
protection of the weaker party. Instead, as Karen Boxx observes,
"Some courts have defined the required element as 'justifiable trust,'
in other words, where one party has justifiably put trust in another to
watch out for the first party's interests."224 As an example, Boxx cites
a case suggesting that an adoption agency might have a fiduciary
obligation to inform prospective parents about a child's prior mental
and physical problems.225 Adoption agencies do not exist primarily to
promote the best interests of the prospective parents; their main goal
is to promote the child's interest in finding a good home. Nonetheless,
the court emphasized that the relationship between the agency and
prospective parents "would reasonably lead the adoptive parents to
place a great degree of trust in the agency," and that the agency's
''superior position" created a duty to look out for the prospective
parents' needs. 226 In this case, the critical issue was whether the
parents' expectation of protection from the agency was reasonable
under the circumstances; after finding that it was, the court applied
223. See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 46, at 45 (arguing that "the very nature of research pre-
cludes a fiduciary relationship between investigators and subjects" because "by definition the
researcher's goal is not the betterment of any particular participant" (emphasis added)). For
similar reasons, Miller and Brody also reject the application of fiduciary principles to the re-
searcher-subject relationship:
[T]he investigator, in contrast to the treating physician, cannot be seen as having a fi-
duciary relationship with research subjects, including those who have a prior physi-
cian-patient relationship with the investigator. In research, the investigator cannot
in good faith promise fidelity to doing what is best medically for the patient-subject.
Howard Brody & Franklin G. Miller, The Clinican-Investigator: Unavoidable But Manageable
Tension, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 329, 336 (2003).
224. Boxx, supra note 167, at 22.
225. Id. (citing Taeger v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Servs., 995 P.2d 721 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1999)).
226. Taeger, 995 P.2d at 727.
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fiduciary principles to ensure that these expectations would be
appropriately enforced.
227
In any event, the critical question is not whether the
researcher-subject relationship necessarily is a fiduciary relationship,
but whether it is sufficiently similar to fiduciary relationships to
warrant the application of a comparable legal approach. As discussed
in Part III, the relationship between researchers and subjects is
characterized by the same type of vulnerability, trust, and expectation
of protection that underlie the relationship between fiduciaries and
beneficiaries. These similarities make fiduciary principles an
appropriate model for defining researchers' duties to subjects, even if
the researcher-subject relationship is different from traditional
fiduciary relationships in certain respects.
2. Determining the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
As discussed above, the nature of fiduciary obligations varies
considerably across different relationships, ranging from the strict
constraints on the pursuit of conflicting interests by trustees228 to the
more liberal rules allowing contractual modifications of the duty of
loyalty among partners. 229 This Section considers the appropriate
level of scrutiny to apply when researchers engage in actions that
potentially compromise individual subjects' medical best interests.
Part V applies this analysis by proposing a specific standard to guide
litigation brought by subjects who experience research-related harms.
Several aspects of the researcher-subject relationship suggest
that researchers should be held to relatively strict obligations to
subjects in clinical trials, similar to the fiduciary duties imposed on
trustees. Even more than beneficiaries of trusts, research subjects are
in a highly vulnerable position. Many subjects are dealing with
serious illnesses, which put them in perhaps the quintessential state
of extreme vulnerability. Often, subjects have either exhausted
standard treatment options or have been unable to obtain standard
treatment because of inadequate access to health care.230 Thus, they
may feel that enrolling in research is their only real option, making
them reluctant to question whether participation is actually in their
best interests. In addition, the therapeutic misconception leads many
227. See Boxx, supra note 167, at 22 (arguing that courts should apply fiduciary principles
for "prescriptive purpose[s]," i.e., to establish expectations about appropriate conduct for others
in the future).
228. See supra notes 174-178.
229. See supra notes 190-195 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
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subjects to harbor unrealistic expectations about the benefits they will
receive from a clinical trial, as well as to ignore the fundamental
differences between research and ordinary medical care.231  As
discussed in Part III, the process of informed consent is often
insufficient to overcome these mistaken beliefs.
232
The vast disparity in knowledge between researchers and
subjects further increases subjects' vulnerability. In general, the
relative knowledge and sophistication of the parties in a fiduciary
relationship is a significant factor in determining the extent to which
a fiduciary will be permitted to pursue conflicting goals. For example,
the relative freedom given to partners to limit the nature and scope of
fiduciary obligations under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act is
based in part on the assumption that partners are typically
sophisticated businesspeople operating on relatively equal footing.233
While the premise that individuals entering into partnerships are
necessarily savvy businesspeople is debatable, 234 it is probably true
that partners are more likely to be in a position of relative equality
than beneficiaries of trusts vis-A-vis a trustee. The model of
sophisticated businesspeople negotiating agreements from a relatively
equal position is clearly inapplicable to the researcher-subject
relationship, given the inherent complexity of research and the fact
that most prospective subjects are not medically trained.
An additional reason for holding researchers to relatively strict
fiduciary duties is their relative independence from day-to-day
oversight in their interactions with human subjects. In general, the
more a fiduciary's actions are subject to external control or oversight,
the less the need for scrutinizing consensual transactions. Thus, the
fact that trustees exercise extensive independent authority235 is one
reason that the law is reluctant to accept the beneficiary's consent to
231. See supra notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
233. See Vestal, supra note 190, at 541 (criticizing the "contractarian" nature of the R.U.P.A.
because it jeopardizes those who are not sophisticated business people). Some commentators,
citing the supposed sophistication of individuals entering partnerships, would go farther than
the Revised Act and let partners completely eliminate the duties of loyalty and good faith and
fair dealing. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project to Revise the Uni-
form Partnership Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 111, 137 n.98 (1990) ("Waivers in the partnership context are
normally negotiated by knowledgeable parties at arms' length. This is hardly a situation in
which mandatory rules are necessary to protect unwary parties.").
234. See Vestal, supra note 190, at 562 (noting the "ubiquitous presence of the partnership
form" and "the widespread participation of relatively unsophisticated individuals in partner-
ships").
235. As Boxx notes, the trustee "holds legal title to fiduciary property and acts independently
of direction except from the trust document, although the trust beneficiaries have the opportu-
nity to observe the trustee and complain about breaches of duty." Boxx, supra note 167, at 19.
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conflicted transactions without some additional assurances of
fairness.236 The trustee's relative independence can be contrasted
with the role of an agent in a principal-agency relationship. Unlike a
trustee, who can disregard the beneficiary's instructions if they appear
to be inconsistent with the terms of the trust instrument,237 an agent
must follow the principal's instructions and is subject to dismissal by
the principal at any time.238 The principal's ability to supervise and
terminate the actions of an agent explains why "the agent owes a
somewhat less rigorous duty of loyalty than a trustee."23
9
While researchers do not have quite the degree of autonomy as
a trustee charged with managing a beneficiary's property, most of the
mechanisms for overseeing research do not apply to researchers'
day-to-day interactions with subjects. Instead, they apply to research
at the macro level-for example, the IRB's initial review of the
protocol, or the DSMB's review of data that come in as the study
proceeds. 240 It is true that, like the principal's ability to terminate an
agent, subjects have the right to withdraw from clinical trials at any
time.241 However, because most subjects lack the information or
expertise to determine whether continuing in a study is in their best
interests, they are likely to depend on the researcher's guidance to
determine whether it is advisable to withdraw from a study. In many
principal-agent relationships, by contrast, the principal has either
independent knowledge or access to disinterested advisors who can
help determine whether the agent is remaining faithful to the
principal's needs.
Nonetheless, while the relationship between researchers and
subjects exhibits many similarities to the trustee-beneficiary
relationship, there are important differences between the two
situations that also must be taken into account. The primary
236. See id.:
The greater the independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary, the greater the
scope of his fiduciary duty. Thus, a trustee is under a stricter duty of loyalty than is
an agent upon whom limited authority is conferred or a corporate director who can act
only as a member of the board of directors or a promoter acting for investors in a new
corporation.
237. Because the trustee must remain faithful to the settlor's intentions, she is duty-bound
to reject instructions by the beneficiary that depart from the settlor's goals. See id. at 20 (ex-
plaing that "the duty of a trustee [is] to carry out the terms of the trust in the best interests of
the beneficiaries, rather than obeying the beneficiaries' instructions").
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
241. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2004) (stating that subjects must be told that they "may
discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject was
otherwise entitled").
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difference has to do with the nature of the competing interests that
potentially undermine the fiduciary's pursuit of the beneficiary's
welfare. In the trust context, as well as in the corporate and
partnership conflicts of interests discussed in the previous Section, the
typical problem is the fiduciary's pursuit of personal interests at the
potential expense of the beneficiary. Although fiduciaries can be
subject to competing interests in situations not involving
self-interested transactions-for example, when a trustee must
balance the interests of one beneficiary with a life estate in trust
property against the interests of another beneficiary who will inherit
the property when the first beneficiary dies 242 - those situations still
involve tradeoffs between two or more individuals' economic best
interests. In research, by contrast, the underlying conflict stems from
the researcher's pursuit of societal benefits, as opposed to either her
own economic interests or those of someone else.243 How, if at all,
should this distinction affect the type of scrutiny the law applies to
actions that potentially undermine a subject's medical needs?
If the corporate law standard applied in this context, the
answer would be clear: corporate law draws a sharp distinction
between a director's pursuit of societal or charitable purposes and
self-interested transactions, with only the latter seen as a potential
violation of the duty of loyalty. A corporate board's decision to donate
money to charity, for example, will almost always be reviewed under
the extremely deferential business judgment rule,244 rather than the
"intrinsic fairness" standards applicable to a director's pursuit of
personal gain. However, corporate donations to charity do not
necessarily conflict with shareholders' individual interests; even if the
shareholders must forego immediate profits or dividends, they are
likely to benefit from the good will the corporation ultimately
receives. 245 In research, by contrast, the potential conflict between the
pursuit of societal benefits and the best interests of subjects is
242. See Estate of Hamill, 410 A.2d 770, 773 (Pa. 1980) (citing AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 232 (3d ed. 1967) and noting that the trustee's obligation under such circum-
stances is to make the trust property productive for the life beneficiary while simultaneously
preserving the trust property for successive beneficiaries).
243. Economic conflicts of interest also arise in clinical research, but, as emphasized at the
outset, those conflicts are beyond the scope of this Article. See supra notes 10-11 and accompa-
nying text.
244. See generally A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (holding that a
corporate donation to Princeton University was not a violation of a corporation's fiduciary duty to
its shareholders), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
245. See id. at 590 (noting that the corporation's donation to Princeton University "was vol-
untarily made in the reasonable belief that it would aid the public welfare and advance the inter-
ests of the plaintiff as a private corporation .. " (emphasis added)).
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undeniable, making the deferential corporate law standard entirely
inapt.
However, even if we reject the corporate law standard for
actions motivated by researchers' desire to pursue societal benefits, it
is still arguable that the law should be more deferential when the
fiduciary is not motivated by the potential for personal gain. In fact,
outside the research context, Marc Rodwin argues, the law has been
reluctant to apply broad fiduciary principles to the physician-patient
relationship, 246 in part because of "the idea that physicians should
serve ... interests beyond those of their individual patients."247  For
example, the law requires doctors to breach confidentiality and report
patients who threaten identifiable individuals with immediate danger,
or who have communicable diseases that pose a danger to the public
health. In addition, managed care organizations, acting with the
support of courts and policymakers, encourage physicians to think not
only about the individual patient's welfare but also about the fair
allocation of resources. While these examples may appear to conflict
with the physician's primary duty of loyalty to the individual patient,
Rodwin argues, the law also reflects the idea that "doctors and
medical organizations must also act in the interests of the populations
they serve."24
8
Yet, the fact that research is motivated by the pursuit of
societal benefits rather than personal interests does not mean that the
potential for overreaching by researchers is necessarily reduced.
There have been enough examples of abuses of human subjects in the
246. Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J. L. & MED. 241 (1995). Rodwin argues
that fiduciary law principles have been applied to physicians only for very limited purposes. Id.
at 247-48. These include requiring that physicians not abandon patients, keep information they
learn confidential, obtain patient's informed consent to treatment, and in one case, disclose to
patients any financial interest in clinical research. Id. Aside from these limited circumstances,
physicians - as clinicians - are not held to fiduciary standards, especially with respect to finan-
cial conflicts of interest. Id.
247. Id. at 253. Similarly, some commentators have argued that broad fiduciary law princi-
ples should not always be applied to lawyers. See, e.g., Developments in the Law - Conflicts of
Interest, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1463-64 (1981) (arguing that, despite the lawyer's usual
fiduciary law duty to accept favorable settlement offers, lawyers should be permitted to pursue
public interest objectives by entering into binding agreements with clients that, "absent unfore-
seen circumstances, the litigation will be prosecuted as a test case").
248. Rodwin, supra note 246, at 254 (emphasis added). An example of such a balancing is
the recent announcement that the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy
of Family Physicians will soon recommend that doctors stop treating most ear infections in chil-
dren with antibiotics. As one member of the committee reviewing the guidelines stated, "We are
making a societal trade-off- at the individual level, some kids may have a little bit longer course
of their infection, but for society as a whole, we will be better served if we don't give them." As-
sociated Press, Groups Urging No Antibiotics for Earaches, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004.
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name of scientific progress to establish that researchers' altruistic
motivations do not prevent the exploitation of subjects. In fact, it is
arguable that altruistically-motivated deviations from the subject's
best interests pose even greater dangers than actions motivated by the
fiduciary's desire for personal gain. When a fiduciary engages in a
self-interested transaction, there is at least the potential that feelings
of guilt (or fear of being caught) will limit the extent to which she will
sacrifice the beneficiary's best interests. A researcher struggling to
find a cure for a life-threatening illness, by contrast, is likely to feel
justified by the nobility of her altruistic mission. In the midst of
promising research, it simply may not feel wrong to increase the dose
of a drug for a subject who has reported discomforting side effects-as
compared, for example, to when a trustee skims interest from a bene-
ficiary's account, obviously well aware that her actions are wrong.
Moreover, it is important not to exaggerate the distinction
between the pursuit of societal benefits and personal gain. While
most researchers are genuinely motivated by the desire to do good for
society, the researcher whose study is successful will also reap
personal and professional rewards, including prestige, job security,
and easier access to grants.249 The fact that the primary goal of
research is to produce generalizable knowledge does not mean that
researchers' motivations are necessarily limited to the pursuit of
societal good.
Nonetheless, the unique nature of the conflicts inherent in
clinical trials makes the researcher-subject relationship different from
traditional fiduciary situations in one critical respect. In a typical
fiduciary conflict, we can presume that the beneficiary would be
unwilling to accept any reduction in her economic welfare simply to
help the fiduciary profit. When a researcher is pursuing societal
benefits, by contrast, some subjects may genuinely want to help the
researcher's mission for altruistic reasons. 250  Even subjects not
motivated by altruism may have other rational reasons for accepting
some sacrifice of individualized medical care. 251 The problem arises
when researchers deviate too much from subjects' medical interests to
pursue societal benefits-i.e., when their weighing of the value of
generalizable knowledge and subjects' best interests is insufficiently
protective of subjects' medical welfare - not that subjects may
249. See Norman G. Levinsky, Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in Research, 347 N. ENG. J.
MED. 759, 759 (2002) (observing that "[t]hese dual motives, advancement of medical science and
personal benefits from publications and acquisition of grants, have not changed over the past 40
years as clinical research has burgeoned").
250. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 100-103, 107-108 and accompanying text.
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sometimes receive somewhat less individualized benefit than if
researchers were not motivated by the pursuit of generalizable
knowledge at all.
252
The fact that subjects might not necessarily be opposed to some
tradeoffs between their personal interests and the pursuit of societal
benefit has significant implications for defining researchers'
obligations to subjects. In traditional fiduciary contexts, when the law
scrutinizes a fiduciary's self-interested transaction, the goal is to
ensure that the fiduciary's conflict of interest did not cause the value
of the beneficiary's assets to drop below what it might have been if the
conflict were absent. 253  While the standard for self-interested
transactions by corporate directors is somewhat more relaxed than
that applicable to trustees, 254 the concept of fairness remains tied to
the value the corporation would have received in the absence of a
conflict of interest.
255
This interpretation of "fairness" or "reasonableness" is
inappropriate in clinical research. Because subjects may rationally
choose to sacrifice some degree of individualized medical attention in
order to participate in research, the goal should not be to compare the
subject's experience with the type of individualized treatment a
patient would receive in a traditional physician-patient
relationship. 256 Instead, the law should seek to protect subjects from
excessive deviations from their medical interests, without requiring
252. Delgado and Leskovac use the phrase "conflict of value" to describe the diverging goals
of researchers and subjects. Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 219, at 100. Unlike a "conflict of
interest," which refers to one individual's effort to gain personal benefits at the expense of an-
other, Delgado and Leskovac write, a conflict of value "arises when two or more participants in a
human venture place different values either on the outcomes or objectives of their common effort,
or on the means to be employed in achieving those outcomes or objectives." Id.
253. See, e.g., In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291, 297-98 (N.Y. 1977) (noting that when a
trustee engages in a self-dealing transaction, the general rule in assessing damages is that
"beneficiaries are entitled to be put in the position that they would have occupied if no breach of
duty had been committed" (quoting 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205 (4th
ed. 1988))).
254. See, e.g., HMG/Courtland Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 1999) (indicat-
ing that "fairness is often a range, rather than a point, so that a transaction involving a payment
by the corporation may be fair even though it is consummated at the high end of the range"
(quoting AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS pt.
5, at 202 (1994))).
255. See, e.g., 3 REVISED MODEL Bus.CORP. ACTANN. 1142.39 (3d ed. 1993):
It has long been settled that a 'fair' price is any price in a broad range which an unre-
lated party might have been willing to pay or willing to accept . . . for the property, fol-
lowing a normal arm's-length business negotiation, in the light of the knowledge that
would have been reasonably acquired in the course of such negotiations, any result
within that range being 'fair.'
256. Such a standard would essentially replicate the first view of research ethics discussed in
Part III.A. of this Article.
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researchers to provide the same level of therapeutic attentiveness they
would in ordinary clinical care. Part V takes up that challenge by
proposing a specific standard to govern cases in which a researcher's
pursuit of scientific benefits allegedly compromises the quality of care
that a subject receives.
VI. A FIDUCIARY LAW APPROACH TO THE CONFLICTS
INHERENT IN CLINICAL RESEARCH
Consider a study that randomizes subjects between standard
treatment and an investigational drug for the treatment of stage IV
pancreatic cancer, a condition for which available treatments are not
very helpful. After the study begins, one subject experiences severe
nausea and has difficulty keeping down food. While other subjects
have also experienced some similar symptoms, this subject's
experience is particularly severe. Because the study is
double-masked, no one knows whether the subject is receiving
standard treatment or the investigational drug. If the subject drops
out of the study, she can receive individually-tailored treatment that
might pose fewer side effects-although it is possible that, if she has
been randomized into the standard treatment arm, the treatment she
would receive outside the study might not differ greatly from what she
is currently receiving. If she continues in the study, however, her
nausea and discomfort are likely to continue.
The IRB may well have acted appropriately in authorizing this
study, assuming a favorable balance between the study's overall risks
and benefits. 257 Nonetheless, the IRB's approval does not free the
researcher from considering the implications of continuing in the
study for the subject's wellbeing. If the subject continues in the study,
suffers increasing discomfort, and ultimately sues the researchers for
causing her injuries, a fiduciary law approach suggests the following
framework for evaluating her claim:
First, the plaintiff would have to show that the decision to
continue in the study posed a conflict between her medical best
interests and the pursuit of scientific knowledge. In other words, as in
a traditional breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, the plaintiff would have
the burden of showing that the researcher was actually faced with a
conflict of interest. 258 If no such conflict existed, any claim for breach
of the researcher's duties would necessarily fail.
257. See supra notes 61 and accompanying text (explaining the standard IRBs apply in
evaluating the risks and benefits of research).
258. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993) (noting that the
plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the existence of a self-dealing transaction).
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Assuming the plaintiff can make such a showing (which should
not be difficult under the hypothetical presented above), the burden of
persuasion would shift to the researcher to demonstrate that the
subject consented to continue in the study after being fully informed
about the risks and alternatives. 259 This requirement mirrors the
approach used in breach-of-fiduciary-duty cases involving trustees,
both in that it treats consent as an absolute requirement in all
situations and that it shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant
once the plaintiff has established that a conflict existed.260  The
trustee approach is appropriate in this context because, as discussed
above, the researcher-subject relationship exhibits at least as much
vulnerability and dependency as the relationship between trustee and
beneficiary. 261
However, even if the researcher can establish that the subject
was given adequate information and expressed her willingness to
continue, the inquiry would not end there. Just as a trustee may not
engage in unfair transactions even if the beneficiary has consented,262
the researcher should have a duty to avoid unreasonable risks to the
subject's medical interests regardless of whether the subject has
knowingly accepted those risks. In other words, under some
circumstances the researcher should be required to override a
subject's decision to continue in a study, if continuing would pose
unreasonable risks to the subject's wellbeing.
The critical question, of course, is giving content to the concept
of "reasonableness" in this context. As discussed above, 263 the
standard used in traditional breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, which
focuses on what might have occurred in the absence of the fiduciary's
conflict of interest, is inappropriate in research, given that some
subjects might reasonably accept some deviations from their medical
interests in order to pursue other legitimate goals. Instead, the
reasonableness inquiry should turn on the extent to which the decision
compromised the subject's medical interests in order to pursue the
potential for generalizable knowledge. This interpretation of
reasonableness would prevent researchers from taking unfair
259. Cf. Dave Wendler and Jonathan Rackoff, Consent for Continuing Research Participa-
tion: What Is It and When Should It Be Obtained?, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., May-June 2002, at
1 (discussing when researchers should approach subjects for "reconsent" after a study has be-
gun).
260. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 230-243 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 177 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 260.
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advantage of subjects without denying individuals the autonomy to
participate in research for reasons that are important to them.
To achieve this goal, the fact-finder should consider a variety of
factors that affect individuals' decisions about participating in
research. Thus, it should take into account the possibility that some
individuals are genuinely motivated by altruism, as well as the other
factors that might lead a reasonable person to continue in a study
even when doing so involves risks to their medical well-being. 264 At
the same time, it should consider the vulnerability inherent in the
researcher-subject relationship, as well as the impact of the
therapeutic misconception on the process of consent. Ultimately, the
purpose of the inquiry should be to determine whether the decision to
continue in the study reflects a reasonable tradeoff between the
individuals' medical interests and other goals that a reasonable person
might plausibly pursue.
If the researcher cannot satisfy this reasonableness standard,
and the plaintiff can show that she actually experienced an injury, the
researcher should be permitted to escape liability only by
demonstrating that the subject's injuries were not proximately caused
by the researcher's deviation from the subject's medical interests.
Putting the burden on the researcher to disprove the causal link
between the breach of fiduciary duty and the damages suffered by the
plaintiff is again modeled on the approach used in cases involving
trustees. 265  Essentially, the plaintiffs burden is simply to
demonstrate the existence of the conflict and a physical injury; at that
point, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on the elements of
consent, reasonableness, and proximate cause.
An important aspect of this approach is that the
reasonableness of tradeoffs between the pursuit of generalizable
knowledge and the protection of subjects' welfare would be based on a
lay community standard, i.e., on the fact-finder's assessment of the
tradeoffs a reasonable person would be likely to accept. The use of a
lay standard is appropriate in this context because the acceptability of
tradeoffs between pursuing generalizable knowledge and protecting
subjects' medical interests is primarily a question about ethics and
values, which are not matters about which researchers can claim
special expertise. 266 Thus, these cases are not like malpractice cases
264. See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
266. However, the testimony of researchers or other experts would still be required to iden-
tify the risks and expected benefits of the particular study. In addition, expert standards of care
would remain applicable in cases alleging ordinary medical negligence committed in the course
of a clinical trial, such as the faulty insertion of a catheter.
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involving ordinary medical treatment, in which the law has
traditionally deferred to the medical profession's own assessment of
the standard of care. 267  When physicians provide treatment to
patients in a non-research setting, the risks and benefits all relate to
the consequences of the treatments for the individual patient.
Physicians can plausibly claim special expertise in determining the
type of treatments most likely to promote the health of their patients,
but researchers know nothing more than the rest of us about the
ethical acceptability of sacrificing subjects' medical interests for the
larger social good.268
This distinction between expert professional matters and
ordinary questions of reasonableness has already been recognized in
the law of informed consent. In Canterbury v. Spence,269 one of the
first cases to hold that physicians must inform patients about the
risks, benefits, and alternatives that a "reasonable patient" would
consider material to a decision, the court emphasized that the
professional standard of care should be limited to questions that bring
the physician's "medical knowledge and skills peculiarly into play."270
In rejecting the professional standard for questions related to the
disclosure of information, the court found that "[t]he decision to unveil
the patient's condition and the chances as to remediation ... is
ofttimes a non-medical judgment."271  The same can be said for
267. In ordinary malpractice cases, the standard of care has traditionally been based on the
custom of the medical community, although many jurisdictions now give juries greater discretion
to decide what they believe a "reasonable practitioner" would have done under the circum-
stances. See Philip G. Peters, The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000):
[J]udicial deference to physician customs is eroding. Gradually, quietly and relent-
lessly, state courts are withdrawing this legal privilege. Already, a dozen states have
expressly rejected deference to medical customs and another nine, although not di-
rectly addressing the role of custom, have rephrased their standard of care in terms of
the reasonable physician, rather than compliance with medical custom.
268. Haavi Morreim similarly argues that the standards of care used in malpractice cases
provide an inadequate basis for evaluating negligence claims against researchers. Yet, she
would still rely extensively on professional opinions, including those of "the broader scientific
community" and "the bioethics community." Morreim, supra note 46, at 40. The approach pro-
posed in this Article, by contrast, rejects the idea that determining the acceptability of tradeoffs
between individual medical benefits and societal interests are "expert" decisions. Cf. Bethany J.
Spielman, Professionalism in Forensic Bioethics, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 420 (2002) (examining
whether bioethicists have sufficiently clear and distinct professional standards to warrant their
use as expert witnesses in litigation).
269. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
270. Id. at 785.
271. Id. States are now "nearly divided" between this "reasonable patient" approach to phy-
sicians' disclosure obligations and the more traditional "reasonable practitioner" approach.
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 406 (3d ed. 1997).
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decisions about balancing the pursuit of generalizable knowledge and
individual subjects' medical needs.
Applying a lay standard in this context would also create
appropriate incentives for researchers. When pursuing scientific rigor
poses potential risks to individual subjects, the researcher would have
to consider not just her own views on the matter, or the views of her
professional colleagues, but how a lay decision-maker is likely to view
the reasonableness of asking a subject to accept the particular
tradeoff. At the same time, because the standard incorporates the
possibility that reasonable people might accept risks to their medical
interests under some sets of circumstances, it would not preclude the
use of methodological features that require deviations from the
medical best interests of subjects, provided those deviations satisfy a
reasonableness test.
One potential drawback of this approach is that it might reduce
researchers' incentives to obtain subjects' informed consent to aspects
of research that potentially jeopardize subjects' medical interests.
Because the approach would allow even fully informed subjects to
claim that their consent was "unreasonable" and therefore legally
ineffective, researchers might decide that providing information to
subjects is simply not worth the trouble. In fact, they may conclude
that full disclosure would actually do more harm than good, to the
extent it ends up scaring some subjects away from a study. Of course,
researchers have incentives other than fear of litigation to comply
with their informed consent obligations, 272 but those incentives have
so far done little to ensure that subjects are adequately informed.273
In order to create appropriate incentives for researchers to
provide sufficient information to subjects, it would therefore be useful
to provide an additional remedy for subjects who were never given the
opportunity to consent. Such an additional remedy would be
consistent with the law applicable to trustees, under which conflicting
transactions are voidable by the beneficiary, regardless of their
fairness, if the trustee did not obtain the beneficiary's consent. 274 The
analogous situation in the research setting would be a right to recover
dignitary damages when researchers engage in nonconsensual
deviations from the subject's medical interests-even if a reasonable
272. For example, investigators who are found to have "repeatedly or deliberately" failed to
comply with FDA regulations may be prohibited from conducting further research with investi-
gational drugs. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.70 (2004) (outlining the procedure for disqualification of
clinical research investigators).
273. See, e.g., RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 40 (discussing widespread deficien-
cies in the process of informed consent to research).
274. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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person would have consented to the deviation if given the opportunity,
and even if the subject did not experience physical harm.
Some scholars have proposed a similar remedy for failure to
obtain informed consent to ordinary medical treatment. For example,
Aaron Twerski and Neil Cohen, criticizing the emphasis on causation
in prevailing informed consent jurisprudence, argue that informed
consent doctrine should instead focus on protecting "the decision
rights of the plaintiff which the defendant destroyed by withholding
adequate information."275 Under such an approach, a plaintiff could
recover damages for violation of her right to participate in the
decisionmaking process, without having to prove that she would have
made a different decision if adequate information had been
disclosed.276 Although the courts have never adopted this approach in
cases involving standard medical treatment, it is possible that they
might take a different view in the context of clinical trials.
In fact, a federal district court approved a settlement of a class
action against researchers premised on just such a theory. 277 The
plaintiffs in that case were women who alleged that, while they were
pregnant and receiving care at a county hospital, they were subjected
to repeated amniocentesis testing as part of a study, without ever
having been told that they were participating in research. The
plaintiffs' theory was that, even though they did not suffer any
physical injuries, the repeated testing constituted a violation of their
dignitary interests. Although the court's approval of the settlement
does not mean that it would have ruled for the plaintiffs on the merits,
the case is nonetheless notable as the first litigation to have "produced
a substantial monetary recovery to a class of human subjects of
biomedical research in the absence of any claim of physical injury."278
The argument for recognizing a cause of action based on the
failure to obtain proper consent, even when that failure was not the
proximate cause of any physical harm, is stronger in research than in
ordinary clinical treatment. In the clinical setting, obtaining informed
consent is certainly an important ethical and legal requirement, but it
is not the only basis for justifying a physician's provision of medical
treatment. In addition to the patient's consent, the physician's actions
275. Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts:
The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 609.
276. Id. at 608; see also Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice:
A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985) (calling for the courts to recognize a legally-
protected interest in "patient autonomy").
277. Diaz v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., No. 8:90-CV-120-T-25B, 2000 U.S. Lexis
14061, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2000).
278. Id. at *7.
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are justified by the principle of beneficence: by providing treatment
that meets the prevailing standard of care, the physician is helping to
promote the patient's medical wellbeing. In research, by contrast,
informed consent is the primary justification for performing risky
interventions that have no potential to benefit the subject's individual
medical interests. With a few narrow exceptions, 279 imposing risks on
subjects for the benefit of others, without the informed consent of the
subjects or their legally authorized representatives, would be a
flagrant violation of individual dignity. 280  Thus, nonconsensual
research is a far greater violation of personal dignity than
nonconsensual treatment, and therefore justifies a remedy even if one
does not exist for nonconsensual treatment that does not directly
cause physical harm.
In addition, providing a remedy for the failure to inform
subjects of aspects of studies that potentially compromise their
interests would create a greater incentive for researchers to identify
situations where the pursuit of generalizable knowledge threatens
subjects' medical welfare. Thus, researchers may be more likely to
engage in active monitoring of subjects' experience during clinical
trials. Additional monitoring may ultimately lead to fewer situations
in which subjects experience physical harm.
VII. CONCLUSION
The approach proposed in this Article is designed to provide a
middle ground between the two extreme positions that have
dominated contemporary discourse on the ethics of clinical research.
In place of either requiring researchers to adhere to the same duties of
therapeutic beneficence that physicians owe patients, or permitting
any deviations from subjects' medical interests as long as the subject
consents, the proposed approach would base researchers' obligations
on a fiduciary law framework. Under this framework, informed
consent would be a necessary but not sufficient justification for
aspects of research that deviate from the subject's medical interests.
In addition to consent, researchers would have the burden of
279. See supra note 86.
280. Cf. Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, re-
printed in JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS: THE AUTHORITY OF THE IN-
VESTIGATOR, SUBJECT, PROFESSIONS AND STATE IN THE HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS 667,
668 (1972) (arguing that the '"wrong"' of human experimentation - making the subject "a passive
thing merely to be acted on" - can be rectified only "by such authentic identification with the
cause that it is the subject's as well as the researcher's cause," which is possible only if the sub-
ject's decision to enroll in research is "autonomous and informed").
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demonstrating that their actions were objectively reasonable, with
reasonableness determined according to a lay point of view.
By rejecting the physician-patient relationship as the model for
researchers' duties, the proposed approach would permit reasonable
deviations from subjects' medical interests in order to pursue
potentially valuable knowledge. At the same time, by treating consent
as a necessary but not sufficient justification for such deviations, it
acknowledges the vulnerability of subjects and the potential for abuse.
Ultimately, this approach recognizes the impossibility of eliminating
the tension between clinical research and the medical interests of
subjects. It therefore seeks to manage the tension to the maximum
extent possible, so that valuable research can continue without
exposing human subjects to unreasonable risks.
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For many years academics have debated whether it is better
to permit hostile acquirers to use tender offers to gain control over
unwilling target companies, or to force them to use corporate
elections of boards of directors in these efforts. The Delaware courts
have expressed a strong preference for shareholder voting as a
change of control device in hostile acquisitions. To force acquirers to
accept their preferences, the Delaware courts have developed a
jurisprudence permitting the effective classified board (ECB), a
poison pill combined with a classified board, to protect target
company management from removal by a hostile tender offer alone,
or through a single corporate election. For companies with ECBs,
this means that a determined acquirer must engage in two corporate
elections over a period of two years to force entrenched managers to
give up power.
In this Article, Professors Edelman and Thomas examine
whether proxy contests, tender offers, or combined proxy
contest/tender offers are more likely to result in value maximizing
outcomes for shareholders when target companies are able to deploy
defensive tactics. The authors begin by showing that prior work
suffers from serious flaws involving the use of voting models that are
inappropriate for analyzing proxy contests.
To develop a more realistic approach to these questions, the
authors employ a probabilistic version of a standard weighted
voting model that explicitly incorporates two critical features of
corporate voting: first, that shares are normally voted in large blocks
rather than in single shares; and second, that independent third
party proxy voting advisors play an important, and often pivotal,
role in determining the outcome of corporate elections. In addition,
the authors explicitly incorporate information about the size of
different corporate constituencies and their voting preferences. Using
their model, Professors Edelman and Thomas show experimentally
how the distribution of shares among various investor constituencies
will affect the outcome of different types of voting contests.
Using this model, and these different sets of assumptions, the
authors find that neither proxy contests, tender offers, nor combined
proxy contests and tender offers will always lead to the desirable
outcome for target company shareholders in any scenario. With each
type of acquisition technique, bidders succeed in obtaining control of
the target company in some value decreasing transactions, and are
defeated in their acquisition efforts in some value increasing
transactions. These results hold whether the authors permit existing
defensive tactics or eliminate them.
Professors Edelman and Thomas conclude that in order to
properly analyze the role of defensive tactics, courts must take into
account the underlying shareholder ownership patterns. This
requires them to engage in a fact sensitive analysis of whether
defensive tactics are impeding or facilitating the maximization of
shareholder value. When the authors examine the Delaware
Chancery Court's decisions, the reasonableness analysis that the
courts have employed to decide whether to overturn defensive tactics
permits them to do so. The authors recommend that the courts
continue to apply this type of analysis in the future with more direct
consideration of the impact of the underlying ownership structure in
determining whether the defenses are being used to maximize
shareholder value.
